RARE EARTH ELEMENTS EXTRACTIONS: Kachin, Shan states and resources allocation

缅媒：稀土元素提取：克钦邦、掸邦与资源配置

作者：掸邦先驱新闻社        来源：掸邦先驱新闻社

SAC and UWSA bases in the areas. Map: SHRF.

SAC和佤联军在这些地区的基地。地图:SHRF。

It is becoming quite evident that the political landscape in Burma or Myanmar isn’t just a plain struggle of ethnic-democratic, anti-junta forces against the tyrannical military dictatorship system only, but a merciless competition of resources control and allocation, particularly zooming in on the extraction rare earth elements (REEs) and other mineral resources.

越来越明显的是，缅甸的政治格局不仅仅是民族民主、反军政府力量反对残暴的军事独裁制度的斗争，而且是资源控制和分配的无情竞争，特别是在稀土元素和其他矿产资源的开采上。

The Kachin State is the first line exploited territory, followed quite intensely by Shan State, according to the recent news making the rounds.

根据最近流传的消息，克钦邦是第一个被剥削的地区，紧随其后的是掸邦。（转者注：克钦与缅军政府为了争夺帕敢矿区，区域面积5,756.5平方公里，占据全世界90%以上翡翠玉石产量区域，已经连续打了13年的战争）。

The KIA has taken over Special Region 1 – a rare earth hub previously controlled by the junta-aligned New Democratic Army Kachin (NDA-K) in October last year and now the Myanmar military council is trying to retake it, including the jade hub in Hpakant, Indawgyi and Bhamo townships, by ramping up its counteroffensive, according to KIA spokesman Colonel Naw Bu. That is how intense the resources control competition is becoming in today’s armed conflict spectrum.

克钦独立军发言人诺布上校说，克钦独立军去年10月占领了第1特区，这是一个稀土中心，以前由军政府结盟的克钦新民主军（NDA-K）控制，现在缅甸军事委员会正试图通过加强反攻重新夺回它，包括帕敢、因多吉和巴莫镇的玉石中心。在今天的武装冲突中，资源控制竞争正变得如此激烈。（转者注：克钦邦第一特区，为前缅共101军区，司令员丁英所控制。2024年10月底，克钦独立军（KIA）攻陷克钦邦第一特区首府板瓦，11月20日，克钦独立军攻克甘拜地口岸后，克钦邦境内中缅边境缅方一侧所有口岸均已被KIA控制。）

Although KIA allowed shipments of the existing rare earth inventories to China, to resume operations at full capacity, the KIA needs an agreement with China, which seems quite problematic for the time being, reported Reuters,

据路透社报道，虽然KIA允许将现有的稀土库存运往中国，但要恢复满负荷生产，需要与中国达成协议，这在目前看来是一个很大的问题。

But “(in) October 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) seized control of Chipwi and Pangwa, two towns at the center of one of the world’s most valuable concentrations of heavy rare earth elements. These materials, particularly dysprosium and terbium, are essential to the production of electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. China responded by closing border gates along the Yunnan corridor, halting rare earth shipments from Myanmar,” according to Stimson Center, based in Washington DC, report of June 24, 2025, titled: “Rare Earths and Realpolitik – Kachin Control, Chinese Calculus, and the Future of Mediation in Myanmar”.

但“（在）2024年10月，克钦独立军（KIA）夺取了奇普维（Chipwi）和板瓦（Pangwa）两个城镇的控制权，这两个城镇位于世界上最有价值的重稀土元素集中地之一的中心。这些材料，尤其是镝和铽，对于生产电动汽车、风力涡轮机和先进的国防系统至关重要。中国的回应是关闭了云南走廊的边境大门，停止了从缅甸的稀土运输。”总部位于华盛顿特区的史汀生中心在2025年6月24日发表的题为《稀土与现实政治——克钦控制、中国微积分和缅甸调解的未来》的报告中写道。

“The KIA, meanwhile, has gained not only revenue but leverage. With export volumes near 2023 levels and a fixed price reportedly agreed at 35,000 yuan per ton, the KIA could generate well over USD 200 million annually. This figure surpasses the budgets of several small states. Recent interviews with local actors suggest exploratory discussions on a new ceasefire model. These talks do not center on federalism or political power-sharing, but on border trade, taxation, and mining control. For many ethnic armed organizations, however, resource control has always been integral to their federalist vision. In this sense, resource-sharing is not a substitute for political settlement, but a core component of it,” emphasized the report.

与此同时，KIA不仅获得了收入，还获得了影响力。随着出口量接近2023年的水平，据报道，固定价格为每吨3.5万元人民币，KIA每年可创造超过2亿美元的收入。这个数字超过了几个小州的预算。最近对当地行动者的采访表明，就新的停火模式进行了探索性讨论。这些谈判的重点不是联邦制或政治权力分享，而是边境贸易、税收和采矿控制。然而，对许多少数民族武装组织来说，资源控制一直是其联邦主义愿景的组成部分。从这个意义上说，资源共享不是政治解决的替代品，而是政治解决的核心组成部分。”

Accordingly Chinese miners are now opening two new deposits for extraction of REEs between the towns of Mong Hsat and Mong Yawn. The Shan Human Rights Foundation(SHRF) also confirmed the existence of the two new extraction facilities in its report of June 19.

因此，中国的矿商们现在正在孟Hsat镇和孟Yawn镇之间开采两个新的稀土矿床。掸族人权基金会（SHRF）在6月19日的报告中也证实了这两个新的提取设施的存在。

Mong Bawk area which is located Southeast of Panghsang, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) capital, has been an REEs extraction center since 2015.

Bawk地区位于佤邦联军（UWSA）首府邦尚（pangsang）东南部，自2015年以来一直是稀土开采中心。

Thus, it seems the Chinese companies are pushing to extract more REEs in Shan State territories controlled by the UWSA, which is its proxy. So much so, media are starting to dubbed UWSA as a Wagner-like mercenary outfit for China.

因此，中国公司似乎正在推动在佤联军（UWSA）控制的掸邦领土上开采更多稀土。佤联军是其代理人。因此，媒体开始将佤联军称为中国的瓦格纳式雇佣军。

Rare earth mining in Shan State

掸邦的稀土开采

According to SHAN report of June 24, three rare earth mines in the Wa-controlled Mong Bawk area ten years ago have now expanded into 26 mines in 2025 along the hills south of Mong Bawk town, the SHRF said in a statement released recently.

根据SHAN 6月24日的报道，SHRF在最近发布的一份声明中表示，十年前在wa控制的孟Bawk地区的三个稀土矿现在已经在2025年扩大到26个矿山，沿着孟Bawk镇以南的山区。

“The expansion of these rare earth mines has accelerated since the 2021 military coup,” said SHRF spokesperson Sai Hor Hseng. “Because the area is under UWSA control, mining has gone ahead unchecked.”

“自2021年军事政变以来，这些稀土矿的扩张速度加快，”SHRF发言人Sai Hor Hseng说。“由于该地区在佤联军的控制之下，采矿一直在不受限制地进行。”

Three of the rare earth mines near the China–Myanmar border are just 3 to 4 kilometers from Mong Bawk town.

中缅边境附近的三个稀土矿距离孟Bawk镇只有3到4公里。

Rare earth elements are essential for producing electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, smartphones, computers, and other electronic devices.

稀土元素对于生产电动汽车（ev）、风力涡轮机、智能手机、电脑和其他电子设备至关重要。

According to SHRF, the mining operations in Mong Bawk are not officially listed as of the list published in November 2021. Thus, it is quite clear that it is an arrangement between the UWSA and China, effectively bypassing the military junta regime, which China actually supports it.

根据SHRF的说法，截至2021年11月公布的名单，孟Bawk的采矿业务并未正式列入名单。因此，很明显，这是佤联军和中国之间的安排，有效地绕过了中国实际上支持的军政府政权。

“Chinese companies are being allowed to mine rare earths in UWSA-controlled areas without Naypyidaw’s approval. These minerals are likely being exported directly across the border into China,” Sai Hor Hseng said. However, he added that SHRF could not confirm the specific companies involved.

“中国公司被允许在佤联军控制的地区开采稀土，而无需得到内比都的批准。这些矿产很可能直接越过边境出口到中国。”然而，他补充说，SHRF无法确认涉及的具体公司。

Rare earth mining is also taking place in the Mong Yawn area of Mong Hsat Township, near the Thai–Myanmar border, another territory controlled by the UWSA. Satellite images show at least two mines in Mong Yawn, around 25 kilometers from Thailand’s Chiang Mai Province. However, exports from Mong Yawn are reportedly restricted to military council-controlled checkpoints, which means the junta may also benefit from this REEs extraction.

在靠近泰缅边境的孟Hsat镇孟Yawn地区也在进行稀土开采，这是佤联军控制的另一块领土。卫星图像显示，在距离泰国清迈省约25公里的孟Yawn至少有两个。然而，据报道，孟Yawn的出口仅限于军事委员会控制的检查站，这意味着军政府也可能从稀土开采中受益。

Myanmar’s rare earth production is estimated at 31,000 metric tons in 2024, according to Statista. The country now ranks as the world’s third-largest rare earth producer, after China and the United States.

根据Statista的数据，缅甸2024年的稀土产量估计为3.1万吨。该国现在是世界第三大稀土生产国，仅次于中国和美国。

Analysis 分析

As we can see the REEs extraction is part of the resources allocation competition, mainly between armed organizations of all sorts, which includes the junta’s Burma Army and also EAOs.

正如我们所看到的，稀土开采是资源分配竞争的一部分，主要是各种武装组织之间的竞争，其中包括军政府的缅甸军队和民地武。

The logic behind is as Min Thayt, social critic and political analyst, puts it in his recent piece in Burmese “Is it ownership competition for natural resources?” pointed out that the armed groups are taxing the population to feed their cannon fodders, while natural resources exploitation and extraction which makes biggest money goes to build up their army even stronger and to expand their territories.

其背后的逻辑正如社会评论家和政治分析家敏泰（Min Thayt）在他最近发表于《缅甸》的一篇文章中所言：“这是对自然资源的所有权竞争吗？”指出，武装组织正在向人民征税，以养活他们的炮筒，而自然资源的开采和开采使他们的军队变得更加强大，并扩大了他们的领土。

“Today, the KIA’s role is beginning to resemble that of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has long controlled tin exports to China from Wa State. The UWSA operates a system of informal taxation, providing stable access to resources in exchange for political non-interference. China has tolerated this model of armed commerce in Wa State and may do the same in Kachin,” according to Stimson report mentioned above.

“今天，克钦独立军的角色开始类似于佤邦联合军（UWSA），后者长期控制着从佤邦向中国的锡出口。佤联军实行一种非正式的税收制度，提供稳定的资源获取渠道，以换取政治上的不干涉。中国容忍了佤邦的这种武装贸易模式，可能也会在克钦邦这样做。”

Thus, Shan State and Kachin State, with the main actors like KIA and UWSA receptively, will hold sway over resources allocations which will empower their respective organizations even further with buyers like China, to the awe and admiration of the other EAOs in the field.

因此，掸邦和克钦邦，以及像克钦独立军和佤联军这样的主要行动者，将控制资源分配，这将使他们各自的组织进一步获得像中国这样的买家的权力，从而使其他民地武在该领域感到敬畏和钦佩。

In sum, REEs extraction, including other natural mineral resources, will be feverishly sought and competed among the EAOs and also the junta’s army. In doing so it becomes clear that the main projection of all armed stakeholders in Burma now is fixed on gaining resources allocations, as it is the most lucrative way to empower them in no time.

总而言之，稀土开采，包括其他自然矿产资源，将在民地武和军政府军队之间被狂热地寻求和竞争。在这样做的过程中，很明显，缅甸所有武装利益相关者现在的主要目标是获得资源分配，因为这是在短时间内赋予他们权力的最有利可图的方式。

Because of this the current situation has become a major arms race, a major wealth race, and a major competition for natural resources, all disguised as seeking solution to the political problems. And in process, the people’s aspirations of rooting out the military dictatorship system and establishment of a genuine federal democratic union have altogether lost their meanings, so to speak.

正因为如此，目前的局势已经变成了一场重大的军备竞赛、一场重大的财富竞赛和一场对自然资源的重大竞争，所有这些都伪装成寻求解决政治问题的办法。在这个过程中，人民希望铲除军事独裁制度，建立一个真正的联邦民主联盟的愿望，可以说已经完全失去了意义。

作者：掸邦先驱新闻社        来源：掸邦先驱新闻社