Who Will Be Myanmar’s Kingmaker?

谁将成为缅甸的缔造者？（机译）

作者：德斯蒙德          来源：伊洛瓦底江

Ta’ang National Liberation Army personnel stand guard in the temple area of a hill camp seized from Myanmar's military in Namhsan Township in Myanmar's northern Shan State in December 2023. / AFP

2023年12月，在缅甸北部掸邦南山镇，塔昂民族解放军人员在从缅甸军队手中夺取的一个山地营地的寺庙区域站岗。/法新社

Since the military coup on Feb. 1, 2021, the revolution that began with peaceful demonstrations has escalated into a full-blown armed struggle, now about to end its fourth year. The landscape of Myanmar’s conflict has dramatically changed since then. The coup makers’ State Administration Council (SAC) has been losing territory to various ethnic groups and resistance forces.

自2021年2月1日的军事政变以来，以和平示威开始的革命已经升级为全面的武装斗争，现在即将结束其第四个年头。从那时起，缅甸冲突的格局发生了巨大变化。政变制造者的国家行政委员会（SAC）的领土一直被不同的民族团体和抵抗力量所占领。

Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) recently claimed, in a military progress report, that its People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and allied ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) had effective control of more than half of the country by the end of 2024. The NUG said 44 percent of the country’s townships are under those groups’ full control while 24 percent are highly contested and influenced by resistance forces. That means less that one third of the country remains under the control of the SAC.

缅甸平民民族团结政府（NUG）最近在一份军事进展报告中声称，到2024年底，其人民国防军（pdf）和结盟的民族革命组织（EROs）已有效控制了该国一半以上的地区。全国统一政府说，全国44%的城镇处于这些组织的完全控制之下，24%的城镇受到抵抗力量的激烈争夺和影响。这意味着只有不到三分之一的国家仍在SAC的控制之下。

To be fair, the majority of the territory described by the NUG is in the hands of EROs. Although EROs have gained significant ground, many are still focusing on their ethnic causes—most importantly, gaining a form of autonomy. But the larger question remains: With their increasing influence over newly formed resistance groups and the respect they have earned from large swaths of Myanmar, will they play a role in changing the central government? Will they be able to move beyond a traditionally narrow ethnocentric approach? What decisive role do the ethnic armed players want to play? In short, who dares to be the kingmaker for a future democratic Myanmar?

公平地说，NUG所描述的大部分领土都在EROs手中。尽管EROs已经取得了显著的进展，但许多人仍然专注于他们的民族事业——最重要的是，获得某种形式的自治。但更大的问题仍然存在：随着他们对新成立的抵抗组织的影响力越来越大，以及他们在缅甸广大地区赢得的尊重，他们会在改变中央政府方面发挥作用吗？他们能够超越传统的狭隘的种族中心主义方法吗？民族武装选手想要发挥什么样的决定性作用？简而言之，谁敢成为未来民主缅甸的决定者？

The Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), revitalized Myanmar’s resistance movement with a large-scale offensive—Operation 1027—in late 2023. They seized 16 townships in northern Shan State between October 2023 and January 2024, until China intervened. In June 2024, they resumed fighting and captured key locations including Lashio city and several townships in Mandalay Region. Due to Chinese pressure, the TNLA and MNDAA have paused fighting, but the AA has continued its offensive in Rakhine State, capturing almost all of the state’s townships by the end of 2024. The AA now controls the most territory among Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, including parts of southern Chin State. Their military success is widely supported by the Myanmar people.

兄弟会联盟由若开军（AA）、达昂民族解放军（TNLA）和缅甸民族民主联盟军（MNDAA）组成，在2023年底发动了大规模攻势——1027行动，重振了缅甸的抵抗运动。他们在2023年10月至2024年1月期间占领了掸邦北部的16个乡镇，直到中国介入。2024年6月，他们恢复战斗，占领了包括腊戍市和曼德勒省几个乡镇在内的关键地点。由于中国的压力，TNLA和MNDAA暂停了战斗，但AA继续在若开邦发动攻势，到2024年底几乎占领了该邦所有的城镇。AA现在控制着缅甸少数民族武装组织的大部分领土，包括钦邦南部的部分地区。他们的军事成功得到了缅甸人民的广泛支持。

Up north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has also been playing a pivotal role by providing training to different PDFs and closely collaborating with the NUG on political leadership. Since September 2024, the KIA has effectively secured all border areas with China under their tight control, and it is currently fighting for the strategic town of Bhamo. In the southern part of Myanmar, despite facing challenges, the Karen National Union (KNU) and Mon EROs have sustained their active fighting, asserting control over a majority of the Thai-Myanmar border.

在北部，克钦独立军（KIA）也发挥了关键作用，为不同的pdf提供培训，并在政治领导方面与NUG密切合作。自2024年9月以来，克钦独立军有效地控制了与中国接壤的所有边境地区，目前正在争夺战略重镇巴莫。在缅甸南部，尽管面临挑战，克伦民族联盟（克伦民族联盟）和孟埃洛斯族仍在继续积极战斗，声称控制了泰缅边境的大部分地区。

These developments highlight the dynamic and complex nature of the conflict, with various ethnic groups playing crucial roles in shaping the future of Myanmar. Their continued influence and territorial gains could have profound implications for the country’s political landscape.

这些事态发展突出了冲突的动态和复杂性，各族裔群体在塑造缅甸的未来方面发挥着关键作用。他们的持续影响力和领土扩张可能对该国的政治格局产生深远影响。

Inter-ethnic relations 种族间的关系

Along with the military victories and public relations efforts of the EROs, the relationship between Bamar (also referred to as Burmese or Burman—the majority ethnic group in Myanmar) and non-Bamar groups has undergone significant changes in the post-coup context. Moving away from a hegemonic approach, the Burmese have started to acknowledge and understand the grievances of ethnic minorities, leading to a gradual increase in trust between Bamar and non-Bamar, although it is not yet optimal. For instance, “Du Kaba” and “Du Chon”—Jinghpaw Kachin dialect words referring to military ranks—have become household words in Burmese heartland areas such as Sagaing and Magwe regions, as many KIA military personnel are commanding PDFs in the central plain regions.

随着军事胜利和EROs的公共关系努力，缅族（也被称为缅甸人或缅甸人-缅甸的多数民族）和非缅族群体之间的关系在政变后的背景下发生了重大变化。缅甸人不再采取霸权主义的方式，开始承认和理解少数民族的不满，导致缅族和非缅族之间的信任逐渐增加，尽管这还不是最理想的。例如，“Du Kaba”和“Du Chon”——景波克钦方言中指军阶的词汇——在实皆和马圭等缅甸中心地区已经成为家喻户晓的词汇，因为许多克钦独立军军人在中部平原地区指挥着pdf。

Despite this progress, many ethnic groups still harbor distrust towards Bamar people, which has led them to prioritize their own ethnic causes over the broader goal. This sentiment is reflected in their stance that Bamar people should build up their own territory and even fight for it themselves. However, it is important to acknowledge that while the Bamar are the majority in terms of population, they currently lack armed power, and partly have a leadership vacuum. This means the Bamar are weak now and need help. The EROs are aiding, but to what extent?

尽管取得了这些进展，但许多少数民族仍然对缅族人民怀有不信任，这导致他们将自己的民族事业置于更广泛的目标之上。这种情绪反映在他们的立场上，即缅族人民应该建立自己的领土，甚至自己为之战斗。然而，重要的是要承认，虽然缅族在人口方面占多数，但他们目前缺乏武装力量，而且在一定程度上存在领导真空。这意味着缅族现在很弱，需要帮助。EROs在提供帮助，但帮助到什么程度呢？

Several possible scenarios exist. One could be keeping the Bamar, including the Myanmar military, weak by allowing them to fight each other in central area of the country. Others include the EROs taking control of central state power by defeating the Myanmar military, or building the Bamar back to a level where they can genuinely share power with their brothers of other ethnicities.

存在几种可能的情况。一种可能是让包括缅甸军队在内的缅族在该国中部地区相互争斗，从而削弱他们的力量。其他包括EROs通过击败缅甸军队来控制中央国家权力，或者将缅甸恢复到他们可以真正与其他种族的兄弟分享权力的水平。

Lessons from history 历史教训

Myanmar’s history, though often centered around the Bamar, includes significant instances where minority groups shaped events in the Bamar Kingdom. For example, the three Shan brothers of the Pinya Dynasty ruled central Myanmar, demonstrating the influence of minority leaders over the Bamar court. In another circumstance, Arakan King Min Bin allied with the Taungoo king to attack the Hantharwady Kingdom, which was controlled by the son of Emperor Bayintnaung. This was a move that changed the trajectory of the most powerful Burmese empire in the 16th century. These examples illustrate that minority groups have played crucial roles in shaping Myanmar’s history, and there is no shortage of such instances. In post-independence Myanmar, the KNU came close to seizing state power when its troops reached the doorstep of Yangon in the 1950s. Now, EROs control more than half of the country and this is continuously expanding. This is unprecedented in Myanmar’s recent history.

缅甸的历史，虽然经常以缅族为中心，但也包括少数民族塑造缅族王国事件的重要例子。例如，平雅王朝的掸族三兄弟统治着缅甸中部，显示了少数民族领袖对缅族朝廷的影响。在另一种情况下，若开王敏宾与东吁王结盟，攻击由巴音糯皇帝的儿子控制的汉达瓦底王国。这一举动改变了16世纪最强大的缅甸帝国的发展轨迹。这些例子表明，少数群体在塑造缅甸历史方面发挥了至关重要的作用，这样的例子比比皆是。在独立后的缅甸，克伦民族联盟的军队在20世纪50年代到达仰光的家门口时，几乎夺取了国家政权。现在，EROs控制了全国一半以上的地区，而且还在不断扩大。这在缅甸近代历史上是前所未有的。

Under such a favorable situation, can any ERO become a kingmaker in today’s Myanmar? Who is willing to wage a war in the most important central zone of Myanmar? Of course, they would do this along with allies and PDFs who are already active there.

在这样有利的形势下，在今天的缅甸，任何一个ERO都能成为王者吗？谁愿意在缅甸最重要的中部地区发动战争？当然，他们会与已经在那里活跃的盟友和pdf一起做这件事。

There is good reason for EROs to think about these questions seriously. Myanmar’s recent history and unresolved civil war can enlighten us. Although rebel groups have taken control of territory and continue to fight, they can never fully be at peace as long as they lack political guarantees and there is not a genuine power shift. Whoever gains territory or military success, there will be no lasting peace for them as long as state power is concentrated in Naypyitaw. Central power has always been in the hands of the Myanmar military, which only understands hard power and oppression. Increased airstrikes on civilian areas and towns controlled by resistance forces provide recent evidence of this. As long as the SAC or similar institutions are in control of state power, no one is safe. In an interview with Mratt channel, Salai Yaw Mang of the Chin resistance group CDF-Mindat rightly said, “If we see their [SAC] strategy, they could retreat from ethnic land and consolidate in the central plain where their military resources exist. Now they lost Mindat in 2024, but they will come again in 2030 or 2035.” The state needs an overhaul, but that can only be done by controlling the central state power.

EROs有充分的理由认真思考这些问题。缅甸最近的历史和尚未解决的内战可以启发我们。尽管反叛组织已经控制了领土并继续战斗，但只要他们缺乏政治保障，没有真正的权力转移，他们就永远不会完全和平。无论谁获得领土或军事胜利，只要国家权力集中在内比都，就不会有持久的和平。中央权力一直掌握在缅甸军方手中，而后者只懂得硬实力和压迫。最近对抵抗力量控制的平民区和城镇的空袭增加，就是这方面的证据。只要国资委或类似机构控制着国家权力，就没有人是安全的。在接受Mratt频道采访时，中国抵抗组织cdf - minat的Salai Yaw Mang正确地说：“如果我们看到他们（SAC）的战略，他们可以从民族土地上撤退，巩固他们军事资源存在的中原。现在他们在2024年失去了明达特，但他们将在2030年或2035年再次出现。”国家需要彻底改革，但这只能通过控制中央国家权力来实现。

There are several barriers to this. The deep-seated mistrust between ethnic groups and the Burmese, rooted in historical grievances, remains a significant obstacle. Additionally, there is a lack of central leadership among the various ethnic groups, which complicates efforts to present a unified front for a larger offensive. Having no comprehensive political pact leaves many political issues unresolved and contributes to ongoing tensions. Pressure from neighboring countries adds another layer of complexity, as regional dynamics and interests influence the situation in Myanmar.

这其中有几个障碍。少数民族和缅甸人之间根深蒂固的不信任，源于历史上的不满，仍然是一个重大障碍。此外，各民族之间缺乏中央领导，这使形成统一战线进行更大规模进攻的努力变得更加复杂。由于没有全面的政治协定，许多政治问题得不到解决，加剧了目前的紧张局势。来自邻国的压力增加了另一层复杂性，因为区域动态和利益影响着缅甸的局势。

But there is still hope for the Myanmar people, as many leaders of strong EROs have stated that their offensive will continue until the junta is overthrown. But as asked earlier, do any of them really dare to be the kingmaker of Myanmar? We will see the answer to this question before 2025 ends.

但缅甸人民仍有希望，因为许多强大的EROs领导人表示，他们将继续进攻，直到军政府被推翻。但如前所述，他们中真的有人敢成为缅甸的国王吗？我们将在2025年之前看到这个问题的答案。

Desmond is an analyst of international development focusing on the peace process and transition.

德斯蒙德是一名国际发展分析人士，专注于和平进程和过渡。

作者：德斯蒙德         来源：伊洛瓦底江