What’s in Store for Myanmar in 2025?

2025年的缅甸会发生什么？（机译）

作者：伊洛瓦底江         来源：伊洛瓦底江

The world is unstable, and the international system is broken—this is bad news. US President-elect Donald Trump will take office on Jan. 20, marking his return to the White House, and this will create more anxiety and uncertainty throughout the world.

世界不稳定，国际体系崩溃——这是坏消息。美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普将于1月20日就职，这标志着他重返白宫，这将在全球范围内引发更多的焦虑和不确定性。

Compared to the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, Myanmar gets little attention as it goes through civil war and strife with no end in sight. The US has no strategic interests in Myanmar, seeing it as being in China’s sphere of influence.

与乌克兰和中东的危机相比，缅甸很少受到关注，因为它正在经历内战和冲突，看不到尽头。美国在缅甸没有战略利益，认为缅甸在中国的势力范围内。

After a dire 2024, people in Myanmar would like to see meaningful change in the country. For this to happen, neighbors’ intervention and the West’s political weight are vital to shape the landscape in the country. However, in the case of Myanmar, possibilities for intervention and diplomatic tools are limited. But ultimately it is neither the West nor its neighbors that matter most; it is the Myanmar people and their aspiration to challenge the criminals in Naypyitaw. They are the ones shaping the country’s future.

在经历了可怕的2024年之后，缅甸人民希望看到这个国家发生有意义的变化。为了实现这一目标，邻国的干预和西方的政治影响力对塑造该国的格局至关重要。然而，就缅甸而言，干预和外交手段的可能性是有限的。但归根结底，西方及其邻国都不是最重要的；挑战内比都的罪犯是缅甸人民和他们的愿望。他们才是塑造国家未来的人。

No matter what, there will be a change in 2025. This is what we hear from Myanmar people inside and outside, and we hope that real change is coming. Will it be a new federal democratic nation or a failed, disintegrated and fractured Myanmar?

无论如何，2025年将会发生变化。这是我们从缅甸国内外听到的消息，我们希望真正的改变即将到来。它会成为一个新的联邦民主国家，还是一个失败的、分裂的、分裂的缅甸？

Indeed, it is difficult to gauge where the country is headed in 2025, other than to expect that it will slide further into darkness and economic hardship with the spread of armed conflict to central Myanmar.

事实上，很难预测这个国家在2025年将走向何方，只能预计，随着武装冲突向缅甸中部蔓延，它将进一步陷入黑暗和经济困境。

So, what changes will come? Political analysts say that major political events could take place. Will we witness something new and unexpected, like a serpent emerging out of nowhere?

那么，会有什么变化呢？政治分析人士说，可能会发生重大政治事件。我们是否会看到一些新的、意想不到的东西，就像一条不知从哪里冒出来的蛇？

Here are some happenings we may see in this year.

以下是我们今年可能会看到的一些事件。

Election 选举

Will this year bring an election? Or political negotiations? Or bloodshed? Activists and watermelons inside the armed forces say they are determined to see the removal of regime leader Min Aung Hlaing. If this is the case, who will do so? The ethnic armed opposition is striving to end the military dictatorship. Powerful ethnic armies and insurgent groups are maneuvering to advance their agendas, and have so far achieved many military victories as well as territorial gains.

今年会举行大选吗？还是政治谈判？还是流血?武装部队内的活动人士和西瓜说，他们决心看到政权领导人敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）下台。如果是这样，谁来做呢？少数民族武装反对派正在努力结束军事独裁统治。强大的少数民族武装和叛乱组织正在为推进他们的议程而进行机动，到目前为止，他们已经取得了许多军事胜利，并获得了领土。

Will we see the fall of Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, before Armed Forces Day on March 27? Victorious ethnic leaders announcing autonomous regions in Rakhine, Chin and Kachin?

我们会在3月27日武装节之前看到若开邦首府实兑沦陷吗？胜利的民族领袖宣布在若开邦、钦邦和克钦邦设立自治区？

If so, we might see the implosion of the military and the fall of the State Administration Council (SAC). What about the release of detained government leaders including Aung San Suu Kyi who is now 80? If not, might we see her secret burial in an unknown place? Or, more optimistically, will we see the convening of a major political convention to draw up a road map ahead of an election? Then what about neighbors’ intervention, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led “peace keeping forces” endorsed by China?

如果是这样，我们可能会看到军队的内爆和国家行政委员会（SAC）的垮台。那么释放包括现年80岁的昂山素季在内的被关押的政府领导人呢？如果没有，我们会在一个未知的地方看到她的秘密埋葬吗？或者，更乐观地说，我们会在选举前召开一次重要的政治大会，制定路线图吗？那么邻国的干预又如何呢？比如中国支持的由东盟领导的“维和部队”？

Or will we witness something completely unexpected, a political outcome that neither the military regime or opposition forces expect and do not want to see but must accept?

或者我们会看到一些完全出乎意料的事情，一个军事政权和反对派力量都不期望也不希望看到但必须接受的政治结果？

The junta has vowed to hold the election according to an arbitrary timeline, and China said it would back the vote. Many in the opposition have dismissed the election and critics doubt that it can be held under current circumstances. The opposition has rejected the election since it won’t be free, fair or inclusive, serving merely to extend military rule, like the vote in 2010. Acting as a counterpoint to this are the opposition forces including the National Unity Government (NUG), seeking to demonstrate that they are united and offer a credible alternative to the regime. Instead of seeking recognition the NUG should continue to build support among ethnic alliances and demonstrate that it is a viable option to the junta.

缅甸军政府誓言要按照一个武断的时间表举行选举，中国表示将支持这次选举。许多反对派人士对选举不以为然，批评人士也怀疑在目前情况下能否举行选举。反对派拒绝了这次选举，因为它不会是自由、公平或包容的，只是为了延长军事统治，就像2010年的选举一样。与此相对立的是包括民族团结政府在内的反对派力量，他们试图证明自己是团结的，并提供一个可信的替代政权的选择。NUG不应该寻求承认，而是应该继续在少数民族联盟中建立支持，并证明它是军政府的一个可行选择。

The regime leader Min Aung Hlaing is a war criminal, a troll and completely incapable of governing the country. The regime hasn’t been able to put down the rebellion since the coup and has only seen the civil war spread.

政权领导人敏昂莱是一个战争罪犯，一个流氓，完全没有能力治理这个国家。自政变以来，该政权一直未能镇压叛乱，只看到内战蔓延。

Junta military losing ground

军政府节节败退

In 2024, we witnessed significant losses by Myanmar military forces, despite pessimistic analyses from experts on Myanmar. The military’s Northeast Command in Shan State adjacent to China and its Western Command in Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh were captured by resistance forces, with senior military officers and thousands of soldiers killed or surrendering along with substantial quantities of ammunition, weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, and tanks.

在2024年，我们目睹了缅甸军队的重大损失，尽管专家对缅甸进行了悲观的分析。缅甸军方位于毗邻中国的掸邦的东北司令部和位于与孟加拉国接壤的若开邦的西部司令部被抵抗力量占领，高级军官和数千名士兵被杀或投降，同时还有大量弹药、武器、装甲车、火炮和坦克。

The military’s Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs), once feared and admired when they served under former dictator General Ne Win against ethnic insurgents and Burmese communists, faced humiliating defeats in the last two years in Shan, Kachin, Kayah and Rakhine states.

军方的轻步兵师（LIDs）曾在前独裁者奈温将军（General Ne Win）的领导下对抗少数民族叛乱分子和缅甸共产党时，一度令人畏惧和钦佩，但在过去两年里，他们在掸邦、克钦邦、克耶邦和若开邦遭遇了耻辱性的失败。

Thus, the regime has relied heavily on its air force. Now the regime is deeply dependent on China to halt the offensive and to contain the war and ethnic armed organizations based along the China-Myanmar border.

因此，该政权严重依赖其空军。现在，缅甸政权深深依赖中国停止进攻，遏制战争和中缅边境的民族武装组织。

In any case, the good news is the military is in a state of decline; it is weak and shrinking. The military has seen a wave of desertions, defeats, low morale and loss of dignity. With rising resentment in the ranks, opposition figures speculate regime leader could face assassination or overthrow.

无论如何，好消息是军队正处于衰落状态；它是脆弱和萎缩的。军队经历了一波逃兵、失败、士气低落和丧失尊严的浪潮。随着民众的不满情绪不断上升，反对派人士猜测，政权领导人可能面临暗杀或被推翻。

It is important to note that most of the Burman population have shown no sign of regret or sorrow over the losses and major defeats experienced by Myanmar’s armed forces, which they once respected. Rather, they are experiencing schadenfreude—something unprecedented in the modern history of Myanmar’s armed forces. The opposition, whether Burman or ethnic armed groups fighting the regime, enjoy public support. Indeed, this is a watershed moment for the Myanmar military.

必须指出的是，大多数缅甸人对他们曾经尊敬的缅甸武装部队所遭受的损失和重大失败没有表现出任何遗憾或悲伤的迹象。相反，他们正在幸灾乐祸——这在缅甸武装部队的现代史上是前所未有的。反对派，无论是缅甸人还是与军政府作战的少数民族武装团体，都得到了公众的支持。事实上，这是缅甸军方的一个分水岭。

Myanmar’s economic outlook remains bleak. According to the World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor, Myanmar’s GDP is expected to contract by 1 percent in the fiscal year ending March 2025, a downward revision from the previous projection of modest growth. Due to the coup and forced conscription, Myanmar also suffered from brain drain as many young people left the country.

缅甸的经济前景依然黯淡。根据世界银行的《缅甸经济监测报告》，预计在截至2025年3月的财政年度，缅甸的国内生产总值将收缩1%，较之前预测的温和增长有所下调。由于政变和强制征兵，缅甸还遭受了许多年轻人离开该国的人才流失问题。

When it comes to natural disasters (or pandemics), Myanmar is ill-prepared for an increasingly worsening climate and is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world.

在自然灾害（或流行病）方面，缅甸对日益恶化的气候准备不足，是世界上最易受气候影响的国家之一。

Natural disasters such as floods, cyclones, extreme heat and landslides and the ongoing conflict have hit Myanmar’s economy hard.

洪水、飓风、极端高温、山体滑坡等自然灾害以及持续不断的冲突严重打击了缅甸的经济。

Myanmar’s diverse diaspora communities continue to raise funds to support the revolution and will continue to do so in 2025, which they see as a make or break year for the country. Likewise, Myanmar’s independent exiled media will continue (while struggling for funds and facing challenges ahead) to do important work on Myanmar, covering major events this year.

缅甸不同的侨民社区继续筹集资金支持革命，并将在2025年继续这样做，他们认为这是国家成败的一年。同样，缅甸流亡的独立媒体将继续（尽管面临资金困难和挑战）在缅甸做重要的工作，报道今年的重大事件。

Neighbors’ nightmare 邻居的噩梦

China, India, Bangladesh and Thailand are getting restless about Myanmar’s deteriorating situation. Thailand and other neighbors are extremely concerned with border security, increasing drug production and transnational cybercrimes, as well as the flow of refugees and growing exile communities. So, aside from the toothless ASEAN, who will intervene in the Myanmar crisis? China? India? Thailand? China, the most influential external actor in Myanmar, has officially backed the election and is keeping its options open as the situation remains volatile and unpredictable.

中国、印度、孟加拉国和泰国对缅甸日益恶化的局势感到不安。泰国和其他邻国非常关注边境安全、日益增加的毒品生产和跨国网络犯罪，以及难民流动和不断增长的流亡社区。那么，除了无能的东盟，谁会介入缅甸危机呢？中国吗?印度?泰国吗?作为缅甸最具影响力的外部行动者，中国已正式支持选举，并在局势仍不稳定和不可预测的情况下保留选择余地。

Unlike the US, China has serious geopolitical strategic interests in Myanmar, particularly maintaining access to the Indian Ocean. Beijing wants to bring an end to the Myanmar crisis, but on its own terms and in a way that serves these interests.

与美国不同，中国在缅甸有着重大的地缘政治战略利益，尤其是保持通往印度洋的通道。北京方面希望结束缅甸危机，但要按照自己的条件，以符合这些利益的方式结束。

Some analysts think China wants to see leadership change in the military (but not the collapse of the military) to end the reign of commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing. Perhaps China thinks the election may pave the way for Min Aung Hlaing to depart from politics. Or is he preparing to leave? The generals believe they should be the ones running the country and thus they will not depart easily unless they are forced out or find a durable political compromise.

一些分析人士认为，中国希望看到军方领导层发生变化（而不是军队崩溃），以结束总司令敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）的统治。也许中国认为这次选举可以为敏昂莱脱离政治铺平道路。还是他准备离开？将军们认为他们应该是国家的统治者，因此他们不会轻易离开，除非他们被迫离开或者找到一个持久的政治妥协。

Bangladesh will not see any chance to repatriate Rohingya refugees in 2025. Now, the regime is recruiting Rohingya to counter the rising Arakan Army (the AA, an ethno-nationalist group) which controls almost the entire Rakhine State. The United League of Arakan, the political wing of the AA, has expressed a commitment to establishing an autonomous region in Rakhine.

孟加拉国在2025年没有机会遣返罗兴亚难民。现在，该政权正在招募罗兴亚人来对抗崛起的阿拉干军（AA，一个民族主义组织），该组织几乎控制了整个若开邦。AA的政治派别阿拉干联合联盟（United League of Arakan）表示，将致力于在若开邦建立一个自治区。

How will Bangladesh respond to the AA’s consolidation of Rakhine State? What about Muslim extremists? Both Myanmar and Bangladesh are fragile states and Myanmar’s disintegration will only deepen tension and conflict between the two countries.

孟加拉国将如何应对AA对若开邦的巩固？穆斯林极端分子呢？缅甸和孟加拉国都是脆弱国家，缅甸的解体只会加剧两国之间的紧张和冲突。

In any case, at the end of the day, political negotiation will be the key, but the fighting will not end quickly, as Burman opposition and ethnic armies know that their continued military success will give them more political leverage in future negotiations. This is not the time for mediation—not yet.

无论如何，最终，政治谈判将是关键，但战斗不会很快结束，因为缅甸反对派和少数民族军队知道，他们持续的军事成功将使他们在未来的谈判中获得更多的政治杠杆。现在还不是调停的时候。

But this time critics and opposition members say the Myanmar military should not be the key stakeholder in future negotiations and can only be one of many sitting in on the discussion. Better Min Aung Hlaing and his war criminals are no longer there; new and moderate ones in khaki should be participating in the negotiations instead. The military’s charter glorifies the military as playing a leading role in national politics, but that has only brought disaster and reduced Myanmar to a failed state in recent decades. In fact, if they are serious about regaining past glory and strength, the Myanmar military should reform in order to restore its place in history, serving in the future union of Myanmar while retreating from politics. In other words, it should be a professional army that protects and serves the people.

但是这一次，批评人士和反对派成员说，缅甸军方不应该成为未来谈判的关键利益相关者，而只能是旁听讨论的众多国家之一。最好是敏昂莱和他的战犯已经不在那里了；穿着卡其色服装的新温和派应该参加谈判。军方宪章颂扬军队在国家政治中发挥主导作用，但这只带来了灾难，并在最近几十年把缅甸变成了一个失败的国家。事实上，如果缅甸军队真的想要恢复过去的荣耀和力量，就应该进行改革，以恢复其在历史上的地位，在退出政治的同时为未来的缅甸联邦服务。也就是说，它应该是一支保护人民、为人民服务的职业军队。

Last but not least, we would like to congratulate the people of Myanmar; they are the heroes who have kept faith and hope alive in this revolution at it prepares to enter its fifth year.

最后但并非最不重要的是，我们要祝贺缅甸人民；他们是在这场即将进入第五个年头的革命中保持信念和希望的英雄。

We all are living in depressing times, and we are exhausted, but many in Myanmar hope that the murderous regime will be toppled soon, or that some miracle will occur to make them disappear.

我们都生活在一个令人沮丧的时代，我们都筋疲力尽，但许多缅甸人希望这个凶残的政权能很快被推翻，或者奇迹会出现，让他们消失。

Happy ending? 快乐的结局?

However unstable the world, Myanmar citizens deserve attention and applause for their perseverance, resilience and fighting spirit! They refuse to accept the return of military rule and the status quo.

无论世界多么不稳定，缅甸人民的毅力、韧性和战斗精神都值得关注和掌声！他们拒绝接受军事统治的回归和现状。

Have a peaceful and happy New Year!

祝新年平安快乐！

作者：伊洛瓦底江         来源：伊洛瓦底江