Contemplating the Fall of Myanmar’s Junta

考虑缅甸军政府的垮台（机译）

作者：大卫·斯科特·马西森         来源：伊洛瓦底江

Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing during the Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw in March 2022 / AFP

2022年3月，缅甸军政府主席敏昂莱在内比都参加武装节阅兵

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024 has excited the imaginations of the Myanmar resistance and its supporters. Could the criminal regime of Min Aung Hlaing suffer a similar rapid collapse? What would that collapse look like?

2024年底叙利亚阿萨德政权的倒台激发了缅甸抵抗运动及其支持者的想象力。敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）的罪恶政权会不会遭遇类似的迅速崩溃？崩溃会是什么样子？

First of all, it is important first to define “fall.” Does it apply to the apparatus of the State Administration Council or the military as a whole? If the military remains in place, the fall of one junta would probably just result in another junta. Observers have speculated for some time that any replacement regime, possibly under the psychopathic Deputy Prime Minister Soe Win, could be even more ruthless.

首先，重要的是要先定义“坠落”。它是否适用于国家行政委员会机构或整个军队？如果军方继续掌权，一个军政府的倒台可能会导致另一个军政府的出现。一段时间以来，观察人士一直猜测，任何替代政权，可能由精神变态的副总理索温（Soe Win）领导，都可能更加无情。

So what will be the future role of the Myanmar military? Will it continue to exert dominance at the national level? How much of its order of battle can be maintained? Will it cordon off territory where it has been almost defeated, such as Rakhine State, Kachin, Northern Shan State, and many parts of the southeast, and concentrate on securing the country’s center? What would happen if large-scale mutinies and defections to the resistance occur? What if—and this is a nightmare scenario—the military splits into two or more factions that turn their weaponry on each other? An already beleaguered population could face even greater hardship and danger.

那么缅甸军队未来的角色是什么呢？它会继续在国家层面上发挥主导作用吗？它的战斗秩序能维持多少？它是否会封锁几乎被击败的地区，如若开邦、克钦邦、掸邦北部和东南部的许多地区，并集中精力保护该国的中心地区？如果发生大规模的兵变和叛变，将会发生什么？如果军队分裂成两个或更多的派系，互相使用武器攻击对方，这是一个噩梦般的场景。已经陷入困境的人民可能面临更大的困难和危险。

Any comparison to Syria is useful only in the sense that the key factors that appear to have been instrumental in Assad’s flight do not seem to apply to Myanmar. The geostrategic element for one is very different. The dynamics of the conflict are fundamentally different, and so is the political and military culture. That said, the generals do keep a bleary eye on international developments and may have been discomfited by Assad’s rapid ouster.

任何与叙利亚的比较都是有用的，因为似乎对阿萨德逃亡起到重要作用的关键因素似乎并不适用于缅甸。其中的地缘战略因素是非常不同的。冲突的动力根本不同，政治和军事文化也是如此。也就是说，将军们确实对国际局势的发展睁一只眼闭一只眼，而且可能对阿萨德的迅速下台感到不安。

In 2015, ahead of nationwide elections, the then-ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) released a campaign ad that contrasted the chaos that followed the Arab Spring with the largely peaceful transition led by President Thein Sein, so the generals do follow global events to some extent. Min Aung Hlaing obviously disregarded that TV ad, sparking a Myanmar version of domestic chaos just five years later with his coup d’etat.

2015年，在全国大选之前，当时执政的联邦巩固与发展党（USDP）发布了一则竞选广告，将阿拉伯之春之后的混乱与总统吴登盛（Thein Sein）领导的基本和平过渡进行了对比，因此将军们确实在一定程度上关注全球事件。敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）显然无视这则电视广告，仅仅五年后就发动了政变，引发了缅甸版的国内混乱。

But the Syria comparison persists. The National Unity Government’s (NUG) acting President Duwa Lashi La said in a recent interview, “We aim to reach a tipping point in 2025, a similar situation to Syria when al-Assad fled the country. We have to strike a final blow against the SAC. However, international intervention is essential in this transitional period. With simultaneous and collaborative attempts between the international community and resistance forces against the SAC, we believe the SAC would be destroyed at once.” More important than this bluster is the real joint strategy of various ethnic armed organization (EAO) leaders who do not publicize what they are planning.

但与叙利亚的比较依然存在。叙利亚民族团结政府（NUG）代理总统杜瓦·拉希·拉在最近的一次采访中说：“我们的目标是在2025年达到一个临界点，类似于阿萨德逃离叙利亚时的情况。我们必须给SAC最后一击。然而，在这个过渡时期，国际干预是必不可少的。在国际社会和抵抗力量共同努力反对SAC的情况下，我们相信SAC将立即被摧毁。”比这种咆哮更重要的是不同民族武装组织（EAO）领导人真正的联合战略，他们不公开他们的计划。

What Lashi La fails to mention is where international interventions and collaborative attempts would be sourced. China has so far played the most prominent role in Myanmar, in a mostly negative form. The West made it clear, very soon after the coup, that no assistance of the military kind would ever emerge. Why does the NUG still delude itself and its supporters and donors that this is even feasible? Why are there still calls for anti-aircraft capacity to be supplied when there has been a firm no all this time, and EAOs simply fundraise and buy the guns themselves? All these “tipping points” that have been hailed over the last three years—most of them battlefield victories that the NUG had at best a minor role in—have been all point and no tip.

拉什拉没有提到的是，国际干预和合作的努力将从何而来。到目前为止，中国在缅甸扮演了最重要的角色，主要是消极的角色。在政变发生后不久，西方就明确表示，军事援助永远不会出现。为什么国家政府仍然欺骗自己及其支持者和捐助者，认为这是可行的？既然一直以来都是坚决反对的，而且eao只是自己筹资购买枪支，为什么还会有要求提供防空能力的呼声？在过去的三年里，所有这些被欢呼的“转折点”——其中大多数是NUG在战场上的胜利，充其量只是一个次要的角色——都是点，而不是提示。

Many of Myanmar’s political leaders have been criticized for being too optimistic and underplaying the real challenges of governance and cooperation after any victory. The scholar Nyi Nyi Kyaw recently wrote forcefully of the “leadership deficit” in the Spring Revolution. This deficiency will not be reversed the day after any triumph against the military. In fact, it could be exacerbated as bickering NUG officials jostle for position and the inevitable bitter debates about who stayed inside the country and who lived it up in the West further divide the elites. In other words, the key question here must be: are the NUG and other political and military forces ready to take over state control in case of a rapid regime collapse?

许多缅甸政治领导人被批评过于乐观，低估了任何胜利后治理和合作的真正挑战。学者Nyi Nyi Kyaw最近有力地论述了春季革命中的“领导赤字”。这种缺陷不会在对军队取得任何胜利后的第二天就被扭转。事实上，随着争吵不休的国家统一政府官员争夺职位，以及关于谁留在国内、谁在西方生活的不可避免的激烈辩论进一步分化了精英阶层，这种情况可能会加剧。换句话说，这里的关键问题必须是：NUG和其他政治和军事力量是否准备在政权迅速崩溃的情况下接管国家控制权？

Fears of internecine conflict following regime collapse are very real. Myanmar has a long history of inter-group conflict. The EAOs that operate in many parts of the country have been largely disciplined in restraining an escalation of fratricide, especially in such complex battlescapes as Northern Shan State. But looking at dynamics in Chin State and the central region, there is growing violence among many revolutionary forces. So much of the violence in Sagaing, for example, is between “revolutionary villages” and pro-junta communities, a cycle that has degenerated into personal feuds fueled by retribution over reciprocal atrocities, arson, and contentious political loyalties. Competition over identity, resources, checkpoints, and population control will not evaporate if the junta collapses. The notion that there will be a “Burma Brigadoon” the day after regime collapse is dangerously fanciful.

对政权崩溃后内部冲突的担忧是非常真实的。缅甸的族群冲突历史悠久。在该国许多地区开展活动的eao在遏制自相残杀升级方面基本上是有纪律的，特别是在像掸邦北部这样复杂的战斗中。但从钦邦和中部地区的动态来看，许多革命力量之间的暴力活动正在增加。例如，实皆省的许多暴力事件发生在“革命村庄”和亲军政府社区之间，这种循环已经退化为个人恩怨，由相互的暴行、纵火和有争议的政治忠诚引起的报复而加剧。即使军政府垮台，围绕身份、资源、检查站和人口控制的竞争也不会消失。认为缅甸政权垮台后会有一支“缅甸旅”的想法是危险的幻想。

What is happening inside the military?

军队内部发生了什么？

There has always been a tendency to peer inside the opaque military elites and locate a “moderate” general. This has been a waste of time. A lesser war criminal is still a war criminal. Any movement of moderate senior officers, or a grassroots mobilization of foot soldiers who want an end to the conflict, exists for now in the realm of speculation. Most people, especially Western activists, simply do not understand the inner dynamics of the military.

人们总是倾向于窥探不透明的军事精英内部，找到一位“温和”的将军。这是在浪费时间。较轻的战犯仍然是战犯。任何温和派高级军官的行动，或者希望结束冲突的基层士兵的动员，目前都存在于猜测之中。大多数人，尤其是西方活动人士，根本不了解军方的内部动态。

The motivation of many resistance forces and their support bases is the total removal of the military from political life. Justice and accountability are also an ardent desire, as are straight-up revenge and retribution. That partly accounts for the military’s determination to hold out. Simply replacing Min Aung Hlaing with another general will not assuage many armed revolutionaries. And if it came at a time when a domestic civilian movement was sufficiently placed to generate a process of negotiation, it could potentially split the already divided opposition. Already, contentious debates over the “Ngwe Saung Statement” from a clandestine meeting of political actors based inside Myanmar have further riven the NUG and National Unity Consultative Committee (NUCC). And lurking in the shadows will be the inevitable Western peace peddlers plotting to scupper everything.

许多抵抗力量及其支持基地的动机是使军队完全脱离政治生活。正义和问责也是一个强烈的愿望，就像直接的报复和惩罚一样。这在一定程度上解释了军方坚持到底的决心。简单地用另一位将军取代敏昂莱并不能平息许多武装革命者。而且，如果它发生在国内平民运动已经足以启动谈判进程的时候，它可能会分裂已经分裂的反对派。在缅甸境内的政治行为者秘密会议上，关于“Ngwe Saung声明”的争议性辩论已经进一步分裂了NUG和民族团结协商委员会（NUCC）。而潜伏在暗处的必然是西方的和平兜售者，他们密谋破坏一切。

Some EAOs with their own long-term revolutionary agendas could seek some modus vivendi with any new regime that could emerge after a fall. This needs to be planned for. It does not necessarily mean that armed groups seeking their own accommodation with the central state would completely abandon existing support in training, logistics, and weapons. As the Arakan Army has shown since 2020, it can be a viable strategy to pause fighting, consolidate forces, and plan for the next stage of military operations. Other EAOs have similar experience.

一些有自己长期革命议程的eao可能会与任何可能在垮台后出现的新政权寻求某种权宜之计。这需要事先计划。这并不一定意味着寻求与中央政府和解的武装组织将完全放弃在训练、后勤和武器方面的现有支持。正如若开军自2020年以来所显示的那样，暂停战斗、巩固部队并计划下一阶段的军事行动可能是一种可行的战略。其他eao也有类似的经历。

Many communities, already exhausted by four years of destructive conflict, might welcome a respite. But others could equally be motivated by revenge and seek the complete extirpation of the military. There are so many different expectations of what a process of regime collapse would lead to. More violence to completely overthrow the military? Or a gradual process of placing the military under civilian control? But that leads to the question of who? The NUG? Or an alliance of EAOs? There is a lamentable lack of thinking about these scenarios and the possibility of even greater violence in the future.

许多已经被四年的破坏性冲突搞得筋疲力尽的社区可能会欢迎一个喘息的机会。但其他人可能同样出于报复的动机，并寻求彻底消灭军队。对于一个政权崩溃的过程会导致什么，人们有很多不同的预期。用更多的暴力来彻底推翻军方？还是一个逐步将军队置于文官控制之下的过程？但这就引出了谁的问题？NUG吗?还是eao联盟？可悲的是，人们没有考虑到这些情况以及未来发生更大暴力的可能性。

Fall scenarios 秋天的场景

The defeats inflicted on the military since the start of Operation 1027 in October 2023 and on several other battlefields have been unprecedented. But they have also revealed the military to be a functioning institution capable of withstanding setbacks that would have beaten many other armies by now. It has relied on heavy firepower, which has slowed but not stalled resistance advances. We have also seen a dramatic escalation in its use of air power, which illustrates its ability to adapt and innovate. It also shows that there is a “deep military state” of arms production, logistics, and above all the continued loyalty of many soldiers. Another factor is that the Myanmar military still enjoys considerable civilian support, an underexplored phenomenon.

自2023年10月1027行动开始以来，在其他几个战场上，军队遭受的失败是前所未有的。但他们也表明，军队是一个运作良好的机构，能够承受目前已经击败许多其他军队的挫折。它一直依赖于重型火力，这减缓了但没有阻止抵抗力量的推进。我们还看到它在使用空中力量方面的急剧升级，这表明它有适应和创新的能力。它还表明，在武器生产、后勤以及最重要的是许多士兵的持续忠诚方面，存在一个“深度军事国家”。另一个因素是，缅甸军方仍享有相当多的平民支持，这是一个未被充分发掘的现象。

As early as 2021, there were confident assertions that the military’s exsanguination was imminent. But it never happened. Necrometrics—counting casualties in the military—has misled many into thinking that nationwide defeat is imminent. In fact, most conflict data on the Myanmar civil war have been a distracting failure. There is no denying that multiple revolutionary forces have taken over nearly 90 towns by now, inflicting quite possibly tens of thousands of casualties since early 2021, routing hundreds of military institutions, and humiliating the military on a regular basis. But the military is undeniably holding on.

早在2021年，就有人自信地断言，军方的放血迫在眉睫。但这从未发生过。死亡计量学——统计军队伤亡人数——误导了许多人，使他们认为全国范围内的失败迫在眉睫。事实上，大多数关于缅甸内战的冲突数据都是令人分心的失败。不可否认的是，到目前为止，多支革命力量已经占领了近90个城镇，自2021年初以来，很可能造成数万人伤亡，数百个军事机构被击溃，军队经常受到羞辱。但不可否认的是，军方仍在坚守阵地。

The NUG Ministry of Defense announced on Jan. 4 that the junta lost 14,093 personnel in action last year, with several thousand injured. This reverses the ratio of those killed and wounded in most other conflicts, where injuries outnumber deaths; and while the MOD did not outline its methodology, if the figures are even partly based on Khit Thit Media reporting, they should be subject to serious skepticism. Body counts alone simply do not determine military defeat, especially when the counting methodology is untrustworthy. The number of defections has also been overhyped, especially by Western commentators, and has clearly not been a crippling factor for the military.

全国民主联盟国防部1月4日表示，去年在战斗中损失了14093人，数千人受伤。这与大多数其他冲突中伤亡人数的比例相反，在其他冲突中受伤人数超过死亡人数；虽然国防部没有概述其方法，但如果这些数据有一部分是基于吉特媒体的报道，那么它们应该受到严重质疑。单纯的死亡人数并不能决定军队的失败，尤其是在计数方法不可靠的情况下。叛逃的人数也被夸大了，尤其是被西方评论员夸大了，而且很明显，叛逃并没有对军队造成严重的影响。

Min Aung Hlaing’s political defeat would ideally entail his removal from power, either from resistance pressure, an assassination, overwhelming battlefield victory, an internal purge within the military, or an arranged transition to different generals. Yet he has avoided any of these potentialities for nearly four years. We should not discount his ability to hold onto power. It has been speculated since 2022 that the senior military leadership would turn on him over the loss of so much territory and personnel. But that has not happened: not after the fall of Lashio, the almost complete loss of Rakhine State, or the taking of most of Northern Shan State and Kachin. Much of the speculation of why his own institution has not turned on him is fogged in propaganda and wishful thinking.

敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）在政治上的失败，理想情况下会导致他下台，要么是因为抵抗压力，要么是被暗杀，要么是在战场上取得压倒性胜利，要么是军队内部的清洗，要么是由其他将军安排的过渡。然而，近四年来，他一直回避这些潜在的问题。我们不应低估他掌握权力的能力。从2022年开始就有人猜测，由于损失了如此多的领土和人员，高级军事领导层将会把矛头指向他。但这并没有发生：在腊戍沦陷、若开邦几乎完全失守、掸邦北部和克钦邦大部分地区被占领之后。很多关于他自己的机构为何没有背叛他的猜测都是在宣传和一厢情愿中模糊的。

International and domestic factors

国际国内因素

Any fall will be precipitated by a multitude of elements, with a combination of long-term factors and short-term pressure points. These elements are likely to be contested and debated for many years. Any analytical ledger should have a majority domestic side, as military factors such as battlefield losses of territory and material, arms and ammunition production, defection, desertion, and capture of soldiers, as well as political pressure, internal regime dynamics, economic decline, and any potential for a resurgence of popular peaceful protests in urban areas could add pressure. It would be an exhaustive exercise to plot all the factors that could lead to regime collapse.

任何下跌都会受到多种因素的影响，包括长期因素和短期压力点。这些因素可能会被争论和辩论多年。任何分析分类账都应主要考虑国内因素，因为军事因素，如战场上领土和物资的损失、武器和弹药的生产、叛逃、逃兵和俘虏士兵，以及政治压力、内部政权动态、经济衰退和城市地区民众和平抗议死灰复生的可能性，都可能增加压力。要找出可能导致政权崩溃的所有因素，这将是一项详尽的工作。

On the external side of the ledger, China’s role will be pivotal. It has alternated between covert assistance to resistance forces with support for the junta, all pursued to balance its own geostrategic and economic interests. The roles of Thailand, India, and Bangladesh will definitely be important too, but China will loom largest. The role of Western humanitarian assistance in helping people in need is also important, but Western diplomatic pressure has so far been negligible, and pro-ASEAN to boot, and therefore ineffectual. While sanctions have a role to play, they will almost certainly have a limited impact on any regime collapse or transformation. The junta maintains its war economy by manipulating the exchange rate, which has allowed it to ride through half-hearted Western measures.

在账簿的外部，中国的角色将是关键的。它时而秘密援助抵抗力量，时而支持军政府，所有这些都是为了平衡自己的地缘战略和经济利益。泰国、印度和孟加拉国的作用肯定也很重要，但中国将是最大的。西方人道主义援助在帮助有需要的人方面的作用也很重要，但西方的外交压力到目前为止微不足道，而且是亲东盟的，因此是无效的。尽管制裁可以发挥作用，但它们对任何政权崩溃或转型的影响几乎肯定是有限的。军政府通过操纵汇率来维持其战时经济，这使得它能够通过西方三心二意的措施。

International diplomatic pressure by traditional means, like UN Security Council Resolutions and statements, has applied scant pressure on the junta. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have taken umbrage at the stream of critical reports, mostly around human rights abuses, but the senior military leadership will barely have registered them. A plethora of international mediation efforts and potential transition plotting, from Finland, Switzerland, Norway, and the UN Special Envoy (and Lord knows who else) will invariably be judged a failure. So much effort, so many misdirected funds, and so little to show for it! And no accountability to the people of Myanmar, who deserve to be told what is being orchestrated behind their backs in their name.

国际社会通过联合国安理会决议和声明等传统手段施加的外交压力，对缅甸军政府施加的压力微乎其微。外交部可能会对一连串的批评报告感到不满，这些报告大多是关于侵犯人权的，但军方高级领导层几乎不会把它们登记在案。来自芬兰、瑞士、挪威和联合国特使（天知道还有谁）的过多的国际调解努力和潜在的过渡计划，将不可避免地被认为是失败的。这么多的努力，这么多被误导的资金，却没有什么成果！也不对缅甸人民负责，他们有权知道在他们背后以他们的名义策划了什么。

International accountability measures are irrefutably important, but their practical efficacy in pressuring the regime will in all likelihood be negligible. Around the dramatic events unfolding in Syria there was also the announcement of the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeking an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing. This is an important, if Pyrrhic, step, and like many international efforts a fleeting feelgood moment.

国际问责措施无疑是重要的，但它们在向该政权施压方面的实际效果很可能微不足道。在叙利亚发生戏剧性事件的同时，国际刑事法院首席检察官宣布寻求对敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）发出逮捕令。这是一个重要的步骤，尽管代价高昂，但就像许多国际努力一样，这是一个短暂的感觉良好的时刻。

The NUG’s international diplomatic efforts have been largely symbolic and a failure by any realistic measure. They have not succeeded in galvanizing much international opinion, or in eliciting more practical support. The NUG exhausted too much capital on securing the credentials of formal sovereignty in the initial year or so after the coup, and then with a misguided campaign to prove that “revolutionary forces” control the majority of the country starting in 2022. It simply has not convinced many internationally and comes with flawed methodology, as analyst Han Ya convincingly argued in an article in 2024. Long overdue NUG reforms and redirection will likely have little impact on the ground. The exile community will be an important factor, given its pivotal role in fundraising, but where that funding works will need careful unpacking. For many EAOs, diaspora financing will likely be far less than their own domestic war economies.

NUG的国际外交努力在很大程度上是象征性的，从任何现实的角度来看都是失败的。他们没有成功地激起多少国际舆论，也没有获得更多的实际支持。在政变后的最初一年左右的时间里，NUG在获得正式主权证书上耗费了太多资金，然后又进行了一场误导的运动，以证明“革命力量”从2022年开始控制了该国的大部分地区。正如分析师韩亚在2024年的一篇文章中令人信服地指出的那样，它只是没有说服国际上的许多人，而且方法上存在缺陷。早该进行的NUG改革和重新定向可能不会对当地产生什么影响。考虑到流亡社区在筹款方面的关键作用，它将是一个重要因素，但这些资金在哪里发挥作用，需要仔细分析。对于许多eao而言，海外侨民融资可能远低于其国内战争经济。

Almost all the international oracles of imminent collapse have proved false. Any prediction of defeat or fall for the junta in 2025 should therefore be treated with caution. As in all conflicts, chance plays a major role. If the SAC does collapse, whether rapidly or gradually, it will likely come as a surprise to almost everyone. The crucial challenge for the anti-regime forces is to plan ahead for a range of potential eventualities, but with an approach firmly rooted in reality rather than jingoism. There is little evidence that much in the way of visioning any regime fall in 2025 is being pursued.

几乎所有关于即将崩溃的国际预言都被证明是错误的。因此，任何有关军政府在2025年失败或倒台的预测都应谨慎对待。在所有的冲突中，机遇扮演着重要的角色。如果SAC真的崩溃了，不管是迅速崩溃还是逐渐崩溃，几乎所有人都会感到意外。反政府力量面临的关键挑战是为一系列可能发生的情况提前做好计划，但要采取一种根植于现实而非沙文主义的方法。几乎没有证据表明，任何政权在2025年垮台的设想都在努力实现。

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, human rights, and humanitarian issues in Myanmar

大卫·斯科特·马西森，独立分析人士，研究缅甸冲突、人权和人道主义问题

作者：大卫·斯科特·马西森         来源：伊洛瓦底江