Myanmar’s Resistance Is Getting the China Question Wrong

缅甸的抵抗搞错了中国问题（机译）

作者：Htet Min Lwin        来源：伊洛瓦底江

Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing (left) shakes hands with Chinese Premier Li Qiang ahead of a dinner reception during the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit in Kunming, China on Nov. 6, 2024. / AFP

11月6日，在中国昆明举行的大湄公河次区域峰会晚宴上，缅甸军政府主席敏昂莱（左）与中国总理李强握手。/法新社

China’s recent actions in Myanmar have led many observers to conclude that China has sided with the military junta. We argue this is a simplistic view, stemming from sinophobia and a Western-centric lens, with an inherent, concerning risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and consequently harmful to the revolution in Myanmar. This is significant—Myanmar’s revolution has fought against the military dictatorship for almost four years without any external help and has emerged with significant victories during this period. This is exactly the reason it has attracted the powerful neighbor’s attention, which should be understood properly. Now is a critical and testing period for Myanmar’s revolutionary actors—one in which sober judgement with calm and measured wisdom, and strategic engagement with China are most required.

中国最近在缅甸的行动让许多观察人士得出结论，中国站在了军政府一边。我们认为，这是一种过于简单化的观点，源于对中国的恐惧和以西方为中心的视角，有一种内在的、令人担忧的风险，即成为一种自我实现的预言，从而对缅甸的革命有害。这一点意义重大——缅甸革命在没有任何外部帮助的情况下与军事独裁政权进行了近四年的斗争，并在此期间取得了重大胜利。这正是它引起强大邻国注意的原因，我们应该正确理解这一点。对于缅甸的革命行动者来说，现在是一个关键和考验的时期——在这个时期，最需要的是冷静而有节制的智慧和清醒的判断，以及与中国的战略接触。

There is no doubt that China is an influential and powerful neighbor that could have a huge impact on Myanmar politics. However, it is helpful to remember that post-coup China analysis, which has shaped the Burmese public perception and discourse on China, has often been exaggerated with contradictory claims. In May 2023, when then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang went to Naypyitaw and met with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, many analysts concluded that China had everything managed, and had secured its interests in Myanmar. According to commentaries back then, Beijing had successfully leveraged its influence over ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to stabilize the situation, make a peace deal with the junta, and contain the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). However, the events that followed within just five months—Operation 1027, the highly successful anti-regime military offensive launched jointly by the PDFs and Brotherhood Alliance of EAOs—proved these assessments wrong.

毫无疑问，中国是一个有影响力和强大的邻国，可能对缅甸政治产生巨大影响。然而，有必要记住，政变后的中国分析影响了缅甸公众对中国的看法和话语，但往往被相互矛盾的说法夸大了。2023年5月，时任中国外交部长秦刚前往内比都会见缅甸军政府领导人敏昂莱时，许多分析人士认为，中国已经掌控了一切，确保了在缅甸的利益。根据当时的评论，北京成功地利用其对少数民族武装组织（eao）的影响力来稳定局势，与军政府达成和平协议，并遏制人民国防军（pdf）。然而，仅仅5个月后发生的事件——由pdf和三兄弟联盟联合发起的非常成功的反政府军事进攻1027行动——证明了这些评估是错误的。

Rather than reassessing China’s will and capacity to act, the analysts’ discourse swung from the extreme of “China has everything under control” to another extreme: “China is behind Operation 1027”. This was not only contradictory to their previous claims, but totally discounted the revolutionary situation that has led to unprecedented military defeats for the Myanmar generals. This time, the analysts insisted that the offensive was about “capturing Laukkai” and “regaining Kokang territory” because that’s what the EAOs wanted and China greenlighted. Contrary to their predictions, the resistance forces led by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—a member of the alliance—captured the junta military’s Northeast Command in Lashio, northern Shan State in August 2024.

分析师们没有重新评估中国采取行动的意愿和能力，而是从“中国一切都在掌控之中”的极端转向了“中国是1027行动的幕后黑手”的另一个极端。这不仅与他们以前的说法相矛盾，而且完全无视导致缅甸将军空前军事失败的革命形势。这一次，分析人士坚持认为，这次进攻是为了“占领老街”和“夺回果敢领土”，因为这是东亚国家想要的，中国也同意了。与他们的预测相反，由缅甸民族民主联盟军（MNDAA）领导的抵抗力量（该联盟的成员）于2024年8月占领了掸邦北部腊戍的军政府东北司令部。

Unsurprisingly, analysts were quick to attribute the fall of Lashio to China once again, this time citing a meeting between representatives of the State Administration Council (the junta) and the US in Hanoi as a factor influencing China’s alleged shift in position, allowing Lashio to be captured. At this point, that seems more like discounting the agency of the resistance actors in Myanmar at any cost, and exaggerating the role of China, even if it stretches simple logic.

不出所料，分析人士很快将腊戍的失守再次归咎于中国，这一次他们援引了缅甸国家行政委员会（缅甸军政府）和美国代表在河内举行的会议，认为这是影响中国所谓的立场转变的一个因素，导致了腊戍被占领。在这一点上，这似乎更像是不惜一切代价贬低缅甸抵抗运动参与者的作用，夸大中国的作用，即使它延伸了简单的逻辑。

A straightforward explanation is that China’s perception of Myanmar’s conflict has evolved over time, particularly as border trade and key infrastructure projects have fallen under the control of resistance groups including both EAOs and PDFs. Expecting China, with its strategic interests in Myanmar and growing superpower rivalry in the region, to do nothing in this situation is unrealistic. Clearly, China is anxious about the potential for state collapse in Myanmar and the ensuing chaos in its backyard. (Not that we haven’t seen this kind of assessment and anxiety in the case of Western nations.) Naturally, it has prompted Beijing to recalibrate its approach, including pressuring the MNDAA and engaging with the junta leader, and inviting the chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) to Beijing. The prevailing discourse is once again rife with anti-China rhetoric and sinophobia. We have not known the major stakeholders in the Burmese resistance so united and unanimous in their discourse on any issue—except in their sinophobia and hostility against China.

一个直截了当的解释是，中国对缅甸冲突的看法随着时间的推移而变化，尤其是在边境贸易和关键基础设施项目落入包括eao和pdf在内的抵抗组织控制的情况下。指望中国在缅甸的战略利益和该地区日益增长的超级大国竞争在这种情况下无所作为是不现实的。显然，中国对缅甸可能的政权崩溃以及随之而来的后院混乱感到焦虑。（这并不是说我们在西方国家没有看到这种评估和焦虑。）自然，这促使北京重新调整其策略，包括向MNDAA施压，与军政府领导人接触，并邀请克钦独立组织（KIO）主席访问北京。主流言论再次充斥着反华言论和恐华情绪。我们从未见过缅甸抵抗运动的主要利益相关者在任何问题上如此团结一致——除了他们的恐华和对中国的敌意。

Rather than uncritically following these perspectives, which vilify China at every turn, it is time the resistance invest all they have in engaging China constructively. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Min Aung Hlaing in August, his visit was widely misinterpreted as an endorsement of the junta. In reality, both the visit and the subsequent invitation of the junta leader to the regional forum (not a state visit) may have been a calculated attempt to pressure the military into prioritizing stability and exploring pathways to elections, blending carrots and sticks to steer the junta toward a resolution.

与其不加批判地追随这些每时每刻都在诋毁中国的观点，现在是抵抗运动投入全部精力建设性地与中国接触的时候了。当中国外交部长王毅今年8月会见敏昂莱时，他的访问被广泛误解为对缅甸军政府的支持。实际上，这次访问以及随后军政府领导人受邀参加地区论坛（不是国事访问）可能都是经过深思熟虑的尝试，目的是迫使军方优先考虑稳定问题，探索选举的途径，用胡萝卜加大棒的方法引导军政府走向解决方案。

Needless to say, it is unwise to speak with certainty about China’s intentions in Myanmar. It is essential to remain cautious of the actions of any superpowers. However, the portrayal of China as being fully committed to supporting the junta is overblown and dangerous. Such misperceptions fuel unnecessary hostility toward China and unintentionally risk pushing Beijing closer to the junta, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines revolutionary goals.

不用说，断言中国在缅甸的意图是不明智的。对任何超级大国的行动保持谨慎是至关重要的。然而，把中国描绘成全力支持缅甸军政府是言过其实和危险的。这种误解助长了对中国不必要的敌意，并无意中有可能将北京推向军政府，制造一种破坏革命目标的自我实现预言。

Recently, members of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) announced that they will lobby to engage with the incoming Trump administration. Why can’t the same thing be done with China, a big actor that actually matters? The resistance actors should hire professional lobbyists if they don’t know how to engage with China. After the KIO chairman returned from Beijing, the border gates were reopened—showing China responds well when engaged constructively. The junta, for its part, did not shy away from getting professional lobbies to advocate against US sanctions.

最近，平民民族团结政府（NUG）的成员宣布，他们将游说与即将上任的特朗普政府接触。为什么不能对中国这样一个真正重要的大国做同样的事情呢？如果他们不知道如何与中国打交道，那么他们应该雇佣专业的说客。克钦独立组织主席从北京回来后，边境大门重新开放——这表明中国在建设性接触时反应良好。就缅甸军政府而言，它并不回避让专业游说团体出面反对美国的制裁。

Instead of resentment, the resistance should focus on advocacy and diplomacy to China. This means addressing China’s concerns—territorial integrity of Myanmar, state collapse, and economic stability—while articulating how the victory of democratic forces aligns with Beijing’s long-term interests. The resistance needs to demonstrate that it has significant preparedness to safeguard China’s interests post-revolution, a message crucial to gaining China’s confidence. China, for its part, should listen to the aspirations of Myanmar peoples rather than investing in a brutal regime despised by the entire country.

这种抵制不应该是怨恨，而应该集中在对中国的宣传和外交上。这意味着解决中国关心的问题——缅甸的领土完整、国家崩溃和经济稳定——同时阐明民主力量的胜利如何符合北京的长期利益。这种抵抗需要证明，它有充分的准备来维护革命后中国的利益，这是获得中国信心的关键信息。就中国而言，它应该倾听缅甸人民的愿望，而不是投资于一个被整个缅甸鄙视的残暴政权。

The financial success of recent fundraising campaigns like ICO2, which raised US$13.2 million within a few weeks, and the unwavering public support for the NUG, PDFs and EAOs illustrate that this revolution is far from losing steam. The challenge now is to translate this internal momentum into external legitimacy.

最近的筹款活动，如ICO2在几周内筹集了1320万美元的财务成功，以及公众对NUG， pdf和eao的坚定支持，表明这场革命远未失去动力。现在的挑战是将这种内部动力转化为外部合法性。

Now is a true test of leadership, one that will shape not only Myanmar’s future but also its place in a region where China has a constant formidable presence.

现在是对领导力的真正考验，这不仅将决定缅甸的未来，也将决定缅甸在这个中国一直强大存在的地区的地位。

作者：Htet Min Lwin        来源：伊洛瓦底江