MYANMAR NEW YEAR PERSPECTIVE: Ending civil war unlikely in 2025

缅甸新年展望：内战不可能在2025年结束（机译）

作者：赛万塞         来源：掸邦先驱新闻社

From the realpolitik point of view the civil war in Burma or Myanmar would definitely go on at least for a year or two if not longer.

从现实政治的角度来看，缅甸的内战肯定会持续至少一两年，如果不是更长的话。

While the junta is losing ground politically and militarily, with a ratio of control areas of 21% to 42% to the anti-junta forces as a whole, it still has sizable troops and enough arsenal, including its airforce to go on with the destruction the towns and cities, captured by the ethnic-democratic forces.

虽然军政府在政治和军事上节节败落，其控制的地区与反军政府力量的比例为21%比42%，但它仍然拥有庞大的军队和足够的武器库，包括空军，可以继续摧毁被少数民族民主力量占领的城镇。

Of the two major warring groups, ethnic-democratic forces and the Myanmar military junta or State Administration Council (SAC) are both thinking that the advantage is on their side, rightly or wrongly.

在两个主要交战团体中，民族民主力量和缅甸军政府或国家行政委员会（SAC）都认为优势在自己这边，无论对错。

While ethnic-democratic forces can’t be seen as a solid entity, they nevertheless are fighting in tandem, each on their own territories.

虽然民族民主力量不能被视为一个坚实的实体，但他们仍然在各自的领土上协同作战。

For example, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Arakan Army (AA) has been fighting together the SAC in Kachin State for years and now together with the Kachin People’s Defense Force (PDF) which is part of the KIA. In turn, KIA and Kachin PDF also operate in Anyar region like Mandalay and Sagaing with the National Unity Government (NUG)/PDF and local PDF.

例如，克钦独立军（KIA）和阿拉干军（AA）多年来一直在克钦邦与SAC一起作战，现在又与克钦独立军下属的克钦人民国防军（PDF）一起作战。克钦独立军和克钦独立军也在曼德勒和实皆等安雅地区与民族团结政府(NUG)/PDF和当地PDF合作。

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) mainly operate with the Mandalay PDF in taking Mogok. But it is not clear if the TNLA will participate, if the so often talked about offensive launch on Mandalay City becomes a reality.

达昂民族解放军（TNLA）主要与曼德勒国防军（Mandalay PDF）合作夺取摩谷。但目前尚不清楚TNLA是否会参加，如果经常谈论的曼德勒城的进攻成为现实。

The AA trained the local PDF in Magwe Region and are now also fighting with them. In the same vein, AA trained Chin Brotherhood and fight with them in the Chin State taking Mindat recently.

AA在马圭地区训练了当地的民防部队，现在也与他们并肩作战。以同样的方式，AA训练了钦邦兄弟会，并在最近的钦邦占领Mindat与他们战斗。

The information may not be accurate but the ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) helping Bamar revolutionary groups in Anyar is an established fact.

这些信息可能不准确，但民族抵抗组织（EROs）在安雅尔帮助缅族革命团体是一个既定的事实。

If one looks at the northern Shan State war theater, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) made up of the AA, TNLA and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) all helped to train the majority Bamar revolutionary groups in their area, particularly in Kokang area. The Brigade 611 comprising a variety of groups, like the Danu People Liberation Army (DPLA), Bamar People Liberation Army (BPLA), Burma National Revolutionary Army, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), armed wings of Communist Party Burma, and so on were involved.

如果你看看掸邦北部战区，由AA、TNLA和缅甸民族民主联盟军（MNDAA）组成的三兄弟联盟（3BHA）都帮助训练了他们所在地区的多数缅族革命组织，特别是在果敢地区。611旅包括各种团体，如达努人民解放军（DPLA），缅甸人民解放军（BPLA），缅甸国民革命军，人民解放军（PLA），缅甸共产党武装翼等。

It’s known as Ethnic Nationalities’ Brigade and over 1000 strong.

它被称为民族大队，有1000多人。

MNDAA later formed such Brigades and were instrumental in the capture of the whole northern Shan State, including the North Eastern Command of Lashio a few months ago.

民解阵线后来组建了这样的旅，并在占领整个掸邦北部，包括几个月前占领腊戍东北司令部方面发挥了作用。

The point to highlight is that the Bamar revolutionary groups played a very important role in northern Shan State theater of war. The Mandalay PDF trained by the 3BHA is still fighting the junta has become a formidable armed forces among the Bamar revolutionary groups, together with the BPLA and PLA.

要强调的一点是，缅族革命组织在掸邦北部战区发挥了非常重要的作用。由3BHA训练的曼德勒国防军仍在与军政府作战，已成为缅甸革命组织中一支强大的武装力量，与BPLA和PLA齐名。

Now the some Bamar revolutionary groups are all back to Anyar and spreading the resistance movement in leaps and bounds. Political analyst Sai Kyi Zin Soe told Karen Information Center (KIC) recently that they are pressured to return by the year end, by the EROs although he didn’t say from which ethnic states. But it is a positive development even though some said that the TNLA and MNDAA have to give in not to conduct further offensive and agreed to talk peace with the SAC. Somehow, the fighting between the TNLA and SAC goes on in Nwanghkio area, with on and off airstrikes of the SAC.

现在，一些缅甸革命组织都回到了安亚尔，并迅速扩大了抵抗运动。政治分析人士Sai Kyi Zin Soe最近告诉克伦信息中心（KIC），他们受到EROs的压力，要求他们在年底前返回，尽管他没有说明来自哪些少数民族国家。但这是一个积极的发展，尽管有人说TNLA和MNDAA不得不放弃进一步的进攻，并同意与SAC进行和平谈判。不知何故，TNLA和SAC之间的战斗在Nwanghkio地区继续进行，SAC断断续续地进行空袭。

It isn’t clear whether the TNLA and SAC have met, although news said they were about to meet. Further news were not available at this writing.

目前尚不清楚TNLA和SAC是否已经会面，不过有消息称他们即将会面。在撰写本文时还没有进一步的消息。

So far, the talks between the MNDAA and SAC brokered by China was not fruitful, due to fact that the SAC wanted MNDAA to withdrawal from captured territories and the MNDAA wanted to keep it.

到目前为止，由中国斡旋的MNDAA和SAC之间的谈判没有取得成果，因为SAC希望MNDAA撤出被占领的领土，而MNDAA希望保留这些领土。

The same opinion was made public but TNLA secretary Tah Phone Kyaw to BBC in an interview not long ago.

同样的观点也被公开，但TNLA秘书Tah Phone Kyaw不久前在接受BBC采访时表示。

China is said to talk to KIA,TNLA, MNDAA, United Wa State Army (UWSA) but not to Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mongla, a few weeks ago.

几周前，据说中国与克钦独立军、民族团结军、民族daa、佤邦联合军（UWSA）进行了对话，但没有与掸邦进步党（SSPP）、民族民主联盟军（NDAA）或勐拉进行对话。

China and KIA reopened some border trading gates after meeting with the latter and it seems the Chinese sanctions on KIA is resolved, due to rare earth elements import from Kachin State is crucially important to China.

在与克钦会晤后，中国和克钦独立军重新开放了一些边境贸易大门，中国对克钦独立军的制裁似乎已经解决，因为从克钦邦进口稀土元素对中国至关重要。

Eventually, China will also have to deal with AA the same it does with the KIA, which is more with respect and on equal terms, unlike dealing with the other EROs along China-Myanmar border.

最终，中国也将不得不像对待克钦独立军一样，在尊重和平等的基础上处理AA，而不像在中缅边境处理其他EROs。

Quite recently in Rakhein or Arakan State the AA overran Western Military Command in Ann City making it the second SAC’s military command to fall. All the junta’s top military officials are now either POW or dead. It is now on offensive against Sittway, the Rakhein capital and hundreds of SAC families have been evacuated using the only available sea outlet. Thus only Manaung and Kyaukpyu are left for the AA to attack.

最近在若开邦，AA占领了安市的西部军事指挥部，使其成为第二个沦陷的SAC军事指挥部。所有军政府的高级军事官员现在不是被俘就是死亡。现在，它正在向若开邦首府实特韦发起进攻，数百名SAC家庭已从唯一可用的出海口撤离。因此，只有马南和皎漂留给AA攻击。

Maj. gen. Tun Myat Naing commander in chief of the Arakan Army. Photo: Frontier Myanmar.

通米能少将是若开军总司令。图片：缅甸边境。

In Chin State Chin Brotherhood captured Mindat City on December 21 and the following day SAC troops in nearby Kanpatlet negotiated for a free passage and went in to Magwe Region. Thus, southern Chin State is free of SAC troops.

在钦邦，钦兄弟会于12月21日占领了明达城，第二天，在附近的坎帕特特的SAC部队通过谈判获得了自由通行权，并进入了马圭地区。因此，钦邦南部没有国管委的军队。

In Karen State Karen National Liberation Army stormed and captured historic Manerplaw on December 16, which was Karen National Union (KNU) headquarters for many years. The 69 SAC military camps in Mutraw area after the coup in 2021, now only remains 25 to 30 camps the rest are taken over by the KNU.

在克伦邦，克伦民族解放军于12月16日突袭并占领了历史悠久的曼内普劳，这里多年来一直是克伦民族联盟的总部。2021年政变后，穆特劳地区的69个SAC军营，现在只剩下25到30个营地，其余的都被克伦民族联盟接管。

On November 11 last year, the Karenni Army, Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and resistance allies launched Operation 1111 in Karenni State.

去年11月11日，克伦尼军、克伦尼民族国防军（KNDF）和抵抗联盟在克伦尼邦发动了“1111行动”。

They seized most of Loikaw and almost 90 percent of the state. By March 2024, the KNDF reported the seizure of seven towns and 81 junta bases.

他们占领了洛瓦州的大部分地区和该州近90%的地区。到2024年3月，KNDF报告称占领了7个城镇和81个军政府基地。

However, with ammunition running low, the groups withdrew from Loikaw in June during a counteroffensive by around 2,000 junta soldiers and militia allies from Hsihseng in southern Shan State.

然而，由于弹药不足，这些组织于6月在约2000名军政府士兵和来自掸邦南部Hsihseng的民兵盟友的反攻中撤出了Loikaw。

The Karenni forces are trying to retake Loikaw while the SAC forces are trying to dig in and expand into Karenni forces controlled areas.

克伦尼部队正试图夺回洛考，而SAC部队正试图深入克伦尼部队控制的地区。

The situation now is more or less the same, as the year ends.

随着今年的结束，现在的情况或多或少是一样的。

Outlook for 2025 2025年展望

The country’s perspective depends on how influential stakeholders and actors on the ground have projected to further their agendas.

该国的前景取决于当地有影响力的利益攸关方和行动者如何预测以推进其议程。

The SAC is committed to hold election as a political way out to end the deadlock in the hope international legitimacy may at least partially return, never mind whether it is taken as a valid election or not, of course with the promised help of China and also Russia.

国委会致力于将选举作为结束僵局的政治出路，希望至少部分恢复国际合法性，不管这是否被视为有效的选举，当然还有中国和俄罗斯承诺的帮助。

Parallel to it, SAC will combat all anti-junta forces with airstrikes, bombardment and occasional hit squads in Anyar region, while trying to hold ground in some ethnic states big towns that it is still able to hold.

与此同时，SAC将在Anyar地区通过空袭、轰炸和偶尔的打击小组打击所有反军政府武装，同时试图守住一些少数民族州的大城镇，因为它仍然能够守住。

In northern Shan State, the TNLA and MNDAA will stand their ground to be ownership of the captured territories from the SAC. The MNDAA demands of such acceptance has already been rejected in a brokered meeting by the SAC during the meeting in China recently.

在掸邦北部，TNLA和MNDAA将坚持自己的立场，从SAC手中夺取领土。最近在中国举行的会议期间，国管委在一次斡旋会议上拒绝了MNDAA对这种接受的要求。

The KIA is trying push out the SAC troops completely like the AA is doing and about to achieve its aim. KIA is also actively helping the Bamar revolutionary groups in Anyar, including the NUG/PDF, under Chain of Command for Northern War Region.

克钦独立军正试图完全驱逐SAC部队，就像AA正在做的那样，并即将实现其目标。克钦独立军还积极帮助在安亚尔的缅族革命团体，包括北方战区指挥链下的缅甸民族团结军/缅甸国防军。

The AA, now that only Sittway, Manaung and Kyaukpyu are left to take, it issued a statement emphasizing to honor all international investment and open for political dialog, like the one brokered by China in January 2024, which led to ceasefire agreement. However, it lasted only about half a year.

现在只剩下实兑、马南和皎皎了，民盟发表了一份声明，强调尊重所有国际投资，并开放政治对话，就像中国在2024年1月斡旋的那样，最终达成了停火协议。然而，它只持续了大约半年。

The AA may be hinting for the SAC to withdraw from the three said cities to spare destructions of the Chinese investments, which is also in the interest of the Chinese. But the junta may not like to go out empty handed and thus there might be discussion between the SAC, China and AA, on how the cake should be divided among themselves, so to speak.

AA可能是在暗示国管委撤出上述三座城市，以免中国投资遭到破坏，这也符合中国的利益。但是军政府可能不喜欢空手而归，因此SAC，中国和AA之间可能会讨论如何在他们之间分配蛋糕，可以这么说。

In between from Bangladesh side, the voice to deal with the AA as a political entity becomes louder, with the SAC sure to be pushed out completely from Rakhein State. Most probably, the SAC will be encouraged to withdraw by the Chinese so that the already standing business structures won’t be destroyed or devastated.

在此期间，孟加拉国方面要求将AA作为一个政治实体处理的声音越来越大，而SAC肯定会被完全赶出若开邦。最有可能的是，SAC将在中国的鼓励下退出，这样已经存在的商业结构就不会被破坏或破坏。

As for China, it’s national interest is to exploit a wide variety of economic interest of the whole country, from gas-oil pipelines, economic zones, projected railway lines to Rakhein State from China to make use of Indian Ocean, jade import and most importantly, the rare earth elements extraction from Kachin State. All these will be under the scheme of Belt and Road Initiative and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

就中国而言，它的国家利益是开发整个国家的各种经济利益，从天然气石油管道，经济区，从中国到若开邦的计划铁路，利用印度洋，玉石进口，最重要的是从克钦邦提取稀土元素。这些都是在“一带一路”倡议和中缅经济走廊的框架下进行的。

In short, a workable business condition that covers the whole country for China’s national interest.

简而言之，一个覆盖全国的可行的商业环境符合中国的国家利益。

但所有这些都将取决于民盟、缅族革命团体、缅甸民盟和最重要的是，全国人民是否同意中国的计划。

根据中国的方案，缅甸革命团体和缅甸民众不会轻易支持中国的方案，尤其是让敏昂莱将军（Gen Min Aung Hlaing）执掌国家。

因此，除非敏昂莱被赶下台，或者由于西方在若开邦安失去军事指挥而导致军政府内部崩溃，否则内战很可能会有增无减。

作者：赛万塞         来源：掸邦先驱新闻社