The UN and the Long Curse of Opium and Conflict in Myanmar

联合国与缅甸鸦片和冲突的长期诅咒(机译）

作者：大卫·斯科特·马西森          来源：伊洛瓦底江 

Displaced residents work in opium poppy fields to support themselves in Pekon Township, on the border of Karen State and southern Shan State, in February. / AFP

2月，在克伦邦和掸邦南部边界的Pekon镇，流离失所的居民在罂粟田里工作以养活自己。/法新社

One of the latest dark-humor observations emerging from Myanmar is a sense of pride in the country being a world leader at least in one metric: opium production. Number one in the world again! The release of this year’s annual United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey again ranks Myanmar as the leading opium cultivator in the world, way ahead of Afghanistan. However, the scale of the market declined slightly in the past year from its dramatic upward trend of the past few years.

缅甸最近出现了一种黑色幽默，人们对该国至少在鸦片产量这一指标上处于世界领先地位感到自豪。再次成为世界第一！联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室（UNODC）今年发布的年度鸦片调查报告再次将缅甸列为世界上最大的鸦片种植国，远远领先于阿富汗。然而，市场规模在过去几年急剧上升的趋势下，在过去一年略有下降。

The new survey was launched at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT) on Thursday by Masood Karimipour, the UNODC regional director, and research officer Inshik Sim. It showed that opium cultivation had declined by 4 percent from 2023, from 47,100 hectares to 45,200 hectares. Partly reflecting the nature of instability in Myanmar, opium cultivation declined slightly in Northern Shan but increased by 10% in eastern Shan State where there has been almost no armed conflict since the 2021 coup. The yield of Myanmar poppies also slightly declined by 4 percent, from 22.9 kilograms per hectare to 22, but this comes after an unprecedented surge in yield sizes over the past several years, partly due to upgrades in opium cultivation techniques from rain-fed slopes to irrigation systems.

周四，联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室区域主任Masood Karimipour和研究官员Inshik Sim在泰国外国记者俱乐部（FCCT）发起了这项新的调查。报告显示，鸦片种植面积比2023年减少了4%，从47100公顷减少到45200公顷。部分反映了缅甸不稳定的性质，掸邦北部的鸦片种植略有下降，但自2021年政变以来几乎没有武装冲突的掸邦东部的鸦片种植增加了10%。缅甸罂粟的产量也略微下降了4%，从每公顷22.9公斤下降到22公斤，但这是在过去几年产量空前飙升之后出现的，部分原因是鸦片种植技术从雨水灌溉的斜坡升级到灌溉系统。

But what has dramatically changed is the drop in the overall value of the opium economy. The gross value of opium dropped 36-40% in 2024, from (US$ millions) 998-2,460 the previous year to 589-1,570. “Overall, the opium economy generated less revenue for farmers and comprised a smaller portion of the national economy in 2024 relative to the year before,” the report notes. This suggests that while there is a broader international undersupply of heroin and opium, there is an Asian regional oversupply, hence the price drop. The dramatic drop in Afghanistan cultivation in 2022 is still being felt in global supply chains, even though domestic cultivation rose there by 19%, it is still a very low 12,800 hectares, down from its 2022 figure of 232,000. These dynamics, as well as a longer perspective on cultivation in both countries, signal the need for more careful analysis of the opium trade, and not wild conjecture.

但发生巨大变化的是鸦片经济的整体价值下降。鸦片总值在2024年下降了36-40%，从前一年的998- 2460美元（百万美元）下降到589- 1570美元。报告指出：“总体而言，与前一年相比，2024年鸦片经济为农民带来的收入减少，在国民经济中所占的比例也有所下降。”这表明，虽然海洛因和鸦片在国际上普遍供应不足，但亚洲地区供应过剩，因此价格下跌。全球供应链仍能感受到阿富汗2022年种植面积急剧下降的影响，尽管该国国内种植面积增长了19%，但仍只有非常低的12,800公顷，低于2022年的23.2万公顷。这些动态，以及对两国种植的更长远的看法，表明需要对鸦片贸易进行更仔细的分析，而不是胡乱猜测。

How has the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) reacted? The amount of opium eradication by officials as estimated by the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) was 2,502 hectares. Assuming this figure is approaching some semblance of accuracy, it’s rather a dismal showing. In other words, neither the SAC nor the UNODC are having much real impact on the opium economy or the broader drugs trade at all. This should ideally tap the analytical brakes of the hyperventilating crisis-commentators who predicted a mafia dystopia in Myanmar and an explosion of heroin exports. Even opium is impacted by basic supply and demand. However, the opium economy has to be placed into the broader drug market, domestic and for export. Inside Myanmar there are widespread cheap methamphetamines, known as ya ba, sophisticated crystal methamphetamines (mostly, but not always) for regional distribution, plus growing rates of ketamine use, and new drugs on the market such as “happy water” (a cocktail of MDMA, methamphetamine, diazepam, caffeine, tramadol and ketamine mixed with water or other drinks) and rising use in KTV nightclubs in urban areas. Internationally, Myanmar has been a major manufacturer and exporter of crystal methamphetamines for over a decade, although Mexican cartels are making increasing inroads into Asia and the Pacific.

军政府的国家行政委员会（SAC）对此有何反应？据中央药物滥用管制委员会估计，官员根除鸦片的面积为2,502公顷。假设这个数字接近于某种表面上的准确性，这是一个相当令人沮丧的表现。换句话说，SAC和UNODC对鸦片经济或更广泛的毒品贸易都没有多少实际影响。理想情况下，这应该为那些过度紧张的危机评论员的分析刹车，他们预测缅甸将出现黑手党的反乌托邦和海洛因出口的爆炸式增长。甚至鸦片也受到基本供求关系的影响。然而，鸦片经济必须纳入更广泛的国内和出口毒品市场。在缅甸境内，廉价的甲基苯丙胺（俗称“亚巴”）、复杂的水晶甲基苯丙胺（大部分，但并非全部）广泛分布于各个地区，此外，氯胺酮的使用量不断增加，市场上出现了“快乐水”（一种由MDMA、甲基苯丙胺、地西泮、咖啡因、曲马多和氯胺酮与水或其他饮料混合而成的鸡尾酒）等新型毒品，城市地区KTV夜总会的使用量也在增加。在国际上，缅甸十多年来一直是冰毒晶体的主要制造国和出口国，尽管墨西哥贩毒集团正在越来越多地进入亚洲和太平洋。

Who is behind it all?

这一切的幕后黑手是谁？

In attendance at the UNODC report launch was the distinguished anthropologist David Feingold, who first walked into the Shan hills to research opium in 1964. He commended the “clear presentation” and remarked that, “when I went back to the earliest incarnation of this report, this report has improved over the years.” The reports have indeed become more technically proficient than those of 20 years ago. But the glaring obvious gap is who is to blame. Feingold then posed an obvious question: “(I)n the past, there were a number of Myanmar army units that were directly involved in the transport of drugs. And there were a number of other units that were involved in the taxing of drugs. Now, to what extent is that continuing today?” Inshik Sim responded in measured fashion, saying “the situation is more complicated now, but what you observed in the past probably still remains.”

著名人类学家大卫·法因戈尔德出席了联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室的报告发布仪式，他于1964年首次走进掸邦山区研究鸦片。他赞扬了这份“清晰的陈述”，并表示，“当我回到这份报告的最初版本时，这份报告多年来有所改进。”这些报告确实比20年前的报告在技术上更加熟练。但最明显的分歧是谁该为此负责。法因戈尔德随后提出了一个明显的问题：“过去，有一些缅甸军队单位直接参与了毒品运输。还有一些其他的单位也参与了毒品的征税。现在，这种情况在多大程度上还在继续？”辛辛姆慎重地回应说：“现在的情况更加复杂了，但你过去观察到的情况可能仍然存在。”

Masood Karimipour pointed at the Dec. 12 press conference to “increasingly complex dynamics between armed groups in Myanmar that are active, including areas where opium cultivation is going on, and we don’t really have sufficient visibility to assign roles or responsibility to one named party or the other and they fall on different factions. And so it’s difficult for us to get into that kind of speculation. What we can do is confine ourselves to what we can verify. And what’s in the report is what we’ve been able to verify using methodology (as presented). Suffice it to say it’s more or less lawless, many areas where cultivation is going on, and there are multiple parties benefiting from the cultivation, including some armed groups.”

马苏德·卡里米普尔在12月12日的新闻发布会上指出，“缅甸活跃的武装团体之间的动态日益复杂，包括鸦片种植地区，我们真的没有足够的能见度来分配一个指定的政党或另一个政党的角色或责任，他们落在不同的派别。”所以我们很难进行这样的推测。我们能做的就是把自己限制在我们能证实的范围内。报告中的内容是我们能够使用方法（如所示）进行验证的内容。可以说这或多或少是无法无天的，许多地区都在进行种植，包括一些武装组织在内的多方都从种植中受益。”

The report also included some interesting details on “control” and cultivation. “Government control was found to be a protective factor against involvement with poppy at the village level. While 82% of non-poppy-involved villages report government control, only 70% of poppy-involved villages are under such control. The remaining villages mentioned most often insurgents or militia groups as being in control.” This is oddly worded, even for the UN. But one way it could be read is that 70% of poppy-involved villages are under government control. Leaving aside that the SAC are not a government, let alone a legitimate one, this is a stunning admission. Is Karimipour suggesting that 70% of ‘government controlled villages’ are “lawless?”

报告还包括一些关于“控制”和培育的有趣细节。“政府控制被发现是防止在村庄一级参与罂粟的保护因素。与罂粟无关的村庄中有82%报告受到政府控制，而与罂粟有关的村庄中只有70%受到政府控制。剩下的村庄通常被叛乱分子或民兵组织控制。”即使是对联合国来说，这种措辞也很奇怪。但有一种解读是，70%与罂粟有关的村庄都在政府控制之下。且不说SAC不是一个政府，更不是一个合法的政府，这是一个令人震惊的承认。卡里米普尔是在暗示70%的“政府控制的村庄”是“无法无天的”吗？

Looking at where opium cultivation increased in the country, and without any real conflict such as in the north, it’s not that difficult to determine which armed groups operate in eastern Shan State. Probably the biggest is called the Triangle Military Command of the Myanmar army, based in Kengtung. You literally can’t miss it, it’s almost at the center of town and controls thousands of soldiers, though its ranks are likely depleted from having to send troops to shore up conflict areas around the country. However, just like military commands elsewhere in Myanmar, it has a major network of bases along the border and on strategic hilltops, a few of which probably overlook poppy-strewn slopes. There is also a phenomenon well known in military circles called patrolling, where units of soldiers walk around looking for the enemy. In other words, the largest armed force in eastern Shan State probably has a fairly good idea where the opium is being grown.

看看这个国家鸦片种植增加的地方，而且没有像北部那样的真正冲突，就不难确定哪些武装组织在掸邦东部活动。最大的可能是缅甸军队的三角军事指挥部，总部设在广东。你绝对不会错过它，它几乎位于城镇的中心，控制着数千名士兵，尽管它的队伍可能因为不得不派遣部队去支持全国各地的冲突地区而耗尽。然而，就像缅甸其他地方的军事指挥部一样，它在边境和具有战略意义的山顶上有一个主要的基地网络，其中一些基地可能俯瞰着长满罂粟的山坡。在军界还有一种众所周知的现象叫做巡逻，即士兵们四处走动寻找敌人。换句话说，掸邦东部最大的武装部队可能对鸦片的种植地点有相当好的了解。

Probably even militarily stronger are the combined forces of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and their allies the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or the Mong La Group, which stretch down to southern Shan State, and control large swatches of the area including Tachilek. Next comes the Eastern/Kengtung Front of the Shan State Army-South/Restoration Council of Shan State which has bases along the border and operates through most of eastern Shan State. There hasn’t been much open armed conflict between all of these groups since 2002, but heavy militarization persists and the area is still a major transit zone for narcotics flows.

也许军事上更强大的是佤联军（UWSA）和他们的盟友民族民主联盟军（NDAA）或孟拉集团的联合部队，他们一直延伸到掸邦南部，控制着包括大其力在内的大片地区。接下来是掸邦军队的东部/东东阵线-掸邦南部/恢复委员会，该委员会沿着边境设有基地，并在掸邦东部的大部分地区开展活动。自2002年以来，所有这些组织之间没有太多公开的武装冲突，但严重的军事化仍然存在，该地区仍然是毒品流动的主要过境区。

Then at the bottom of the chain are People’s Militia Forces, or Pyithu Sit. While the inner workings of militias in Shan State are murky, their general disposition, command structures and, above all, loyalty has been well documented: they are part of the Myanmar army. UNODC could have easily asked an intern to ‘LMGTFY’ and would have quite quickly come across a neat article from the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) called ‘People’s Militia Forces: Myanmar Military’s ‘Invisible Hand’ from March of 2024. Helpfully, it lists the major groups: 32 in northern Shan State and 11 in southern Shan State. In eastern Shan State, there are eight militias stationed in “Mong Yawng, Mong Hai, Nam Pong, Mong Koe, Mong Ton, Mong Phyak, Pu Na Ko and Lahu Group(s).” It’s inconceivable the UNODC wouldn’t be able to determine all of this unless they are evading the political and security realities that underpin the opium economy and conflict in Myanmar.

然后在链条的底部是人民民兵部队，或Pyithu Sit。虽然掸邦民兵组织的内部运作是模糊的，但他们的总体部署、指挥结构，以及最重要的忠诚，都是有据可查的：他们是缅甸军队的一部分。毒品和犯罪问题办公室可以很容易地要求实习生“LMGTFY”，并且很快就会从掸邦先驱新闻社（Shan Herald Agency for News）上看到一篇整洁的文章，题为“人民民兵力量：缅甸军队的“看不见的手”，从2024年3月开始。有帮助的是，它列出了主要群体：掸邦北部有32个，掸邦南部有11个。在掸邦东部，有8个民兵驻扎在“bb0 yawang, bb1 Hai, Nam Pong, bb2 Koe, bb3 Ton，孟Phyak， Pu Na Ko和Lahu Group(s)”。不可思议的是，毒品和犯罪问题办公室不可能确定这一切，除非他们回避支撑鸦片经济和缅甸冲突的政治和安全现实。

Take the map on page 12 of the report, and look at the Very High Density opium cluster north-east of Taunngyi. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of the Myanmar military would know, this area is between the Eastern Regional Military Command and the Central Eastern Military Command at Kho Lam. The commander of Eastern Command in Taunngyi up until August 2022 was Lieutenant General Ni Lin Aung, who then served as Central Eastern Commander until July 2023, when he was appointed Deputy Minister for Home Affairs and head of the Myanmar Police Force until August this year when he returned to military duties. All during a period when opium cultivation was surging, one of the major officials who would have almost certainly known about it was then appointed as the ostensible point person to stop it. See how the system works?

看看报告第12页的地图，看看东义市东北部的高密度鸦片聚集区。任何对缅甸军事有基本了解的人都知道，这个地区位于东部地区军事司令部和中东部军事司令部之间。2022年8月之前，东依地区的东部司令部司令是尼林昂中将，之后担任中东部司令部司令，直到2023年7月，他被任命为内政部副部长和缅甸警察部队负责人，直到今年8月返回军队。在鸦片种植激增的时期，一位几乎肯定知道此事的主要官员被任命为表面上阻止鸦片种植的关键人物。明白这个系统是怎么运作的吗？

UNODC doesn’t want to point any fingers (anymore)

毒品和犯罪问题办公室不想（再）指责任何人

Almost every year the UN releases opium surveys they provoke these issues of culpability. And every year UNODC gets away with avoiding and their donors never see fit to ask the obvious question: who is behind the protection of the heroin trade? And every year someone gets up at the FCCT and asks the same question (usually the distinguished anthropologist David Feingold, who actually has known the answer for decades). We should all be aware who cultivates opium: poor farming communities always have, not transnational criminal syndicates. And the Myanmar military and their security system protect it for money, as they do the broader drug economy and all other illicit rents.

几乎每年联合国都会发布有关鸦片的调查报告，这些调查报告都会引发这些罪责问题。每年毒品和犯罪问题办公室都在逃避，他们的捐助者也从不认为应该问一个明显的问题：谁在背后保护海洛因贸易？每年都会有人在FCCT上提出同样的问题（通常是著名的人类学家David Feingold，他实际上几十年前就知道答案了）。我们都应该知道是谁在种植鸦片：贫穷的农业社区，而不是跨国犯罪集团。缅甸军方和他们的安全系统为了赚钱而保护它，就像他们保护更广泛的毒品经济和所有其他非法租金一样。

There is a long trail of UN dishonesty that warrants closer examination. SHAN wrote in their ‘Shan Drug Watch’ series in 2009 that they, “long believed that the 1993 figures of Burma’s extensive opiates production (1,800 tonnes) were grossly inflated, and hence the much-ballyhooed reduction of drug production through 2006 was illusory. In 2007, Xavier Bouan, from UNODC, was forced to agree. Speaking with Shan Drug Watch at a drugs forum organized by the FCCT on September 12 (full disclosure, I appeared on that panel), Bouan conceded that the official estimates in the 1990s were based on US satellite intelligence, and were probably not reliable. He went on to say: “We started to do our own survey only after 2000. Naturally, we made a few mistakes at first… [Now, most of] our findings converge with those of SHAN.”

联合国有一长串不诚实的记录，值得更仔细地审查。掸邦民主联盟在2009年的“掸邦毒品观察”系列中写道，他们“长期以来一直认为1993年缅甸鸦片产量（1800吨）的数据被严重夸大了，因此大肆宣传的2006年毒品产量减少是虚幻的。”2007年，毒品和犯罪问题办公室的泽维尔·布安（Xavier Bouan）被迫同意。在9月12日由FCCT组织的一个毒品论坛上，Bouan在接受Shan Drug Watch采访时承认，上世纪90年代的官方估计是基于美国的卫星情报，可能并不可靠。他接着说：“我们在2000年之后才开始做自己的调查。当然，我们一开始犯了一些错误……（现在）我们的大部分发现与SHAN的结果一致。”

Yet as candid as Bouan was, his then boss Jean-Luc Lemahieu was a classic UNODC poser, always quick to conjure one of those pithily moronic slogans that seem to come naturally to country heads: “Opium in essence is about poverty, whereas ya ba is about greed” was one of his. His reward for years of impact-free work in Myanmar? Head of the Afghanistan office. Didn’t that work well? Antonio Maria Costa came next, and will be remembered mostly for his brave prediction that “(t)he once-notorious Golden Triangle has ceased to play a major role as an opium production area and this region can no longer be called the Golden Triangle for the reason of opium production alone.”

然而Bouan一样坦诚,他当时老板让-吕克·Lemahieu就是一个典型的UNODC难题,总是很快,让其中一个简洁有力地低能的口号似乎自然而然的国家首脑:“鸦片在本质上是关于贫困,而丫英航是贪婪”是他的一个。他在缅甸多年无影响工作的回报？阿富汗办事处主任。效果不是很好吗？安东尼奥·玛丽亚·科斯塔（Antonio Maria Costa）紧随其后，人们将记住他最大胆的预言：“曾经臭名昭著的金三角已经不再是鸦片生产的主要地区，这个地区不能再仅仅因为鸦片生产而被称为金三角。”

The steely, determined, crime-fighting Jeremy Douglas came later, but among his swollen sack of cringing quips and media pandering, he was far more candid than his successor. He said in 2023 in response to a question on complicity in the opium trade, “(t)here are groups that are under the umbrella of the security services of Myanmar and there are others which are not under that umbrella, which are independent and advocating for their autonomy. The ones under the umbrella have a formalized relationship, and they have their territory and they’re more or less left alone. It’s hard to believe that they don’t know what’s going on in territory of the border guard or people’s militia forces, which we know, and the Thais know, and everyone seems to know, are involved.”

钢铁般的、坚定的、打击犯罪的杰里米·道格拉斯后来出现了，但在他那一大堆令人畏缩的讽刺和媒体的迎合中，他比他的继任者要坦率得多。他在2023年回答有关鸦片贸易共谋的问题时说：“有些组织在缅甸安全部门的保护伞下，还有一些组织不在保护伞下，他们是独立的，主张自治。保护伞下的人有正式的关系，他们有自己的领土，他们或多或少是独立的。很难相信他们不知道在边防军或民兵部队的领土上发生了什么，我们知道，泰国人知道，似乎每个人都知道，他们参与其中。”

By then, he’d had partly learnt his lesson from past transgressions. The well-respected Transnational Institute (TNI) had to scold Douglas and UNODC in 2019 because of their shoddy claims in the 2018 Opium Survey claiming cultivation areas and blaming cultivation and protection on the Kachin Independence Organization and the RCSS, both of whom issued public statements criticizing UNODC. That year, I gave a briefing to diplomats in Yangon alongside a senior UNODC official on the booming crystal methamphetamine trade. I pointed out that research I had been part of concurred with most of UNODC’s findings but the agency wasn’t pointing out which armed groups actually operated in the territory where the super-labs were operating. Just months later, the security forces raided the Kaung Kha militia area in Kutkai where a major lab was uncovered. They definitely knew.

到那时，他已经部分地从过去的过失中吸取了教训。备受尊敬的跨国研究所（TNI）不得不在2019年指责道格拉斯和毒品和犯罪问题办公室，因为他们在2018年的鸦片调查中声称种植区域，并将种植和保护归咎于克钦独立组织和RCSS，两者都发表了公开声明批评毒品和犯罪问题办公室。那一年，我与联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室的一名高级官员一起，向仰光的外交官们通报了水晶冰毒贸易蓬勃发展的情况。我指出，我参与的研究与联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室的大多数调查结果一致，但该机构没有指出在超级实验室运作的地区实际上有哪些武装团体在活动。就在几个月后，安全部队突袭了库特凯的康卡民兵区，在那里发现了一个大型实验室。他们肯定知道。

At the Opium Survey launch in January 2023, Douglas claimed that the “Golden Triangle was back in the opium business” but also acknowledged that simple police work cannot address the problem, which required broader insight into the political context of the trade: something that many observers of the opium trade have been stressing for decades.

在2023年1月的鸦片调查发布会上，道格拉斯声称“金三角又回到了鸦片生意中”，但他也承认，简单的警察工作无法解决问题，这需要更广泛地洞察鸦片贸易的政治背景：这是许多鸦片贸易观察家几十年来一直强调的。

This year’s opium survey was financed by the governments of America and Japan. It is curious why those two governments don’t want to get to the bottom of who is actually involved in the heroin trade. And yet these dynamics of undulating opium production and official protection, and outright enrichment by many officials, have been permitted to fester for decades. It’s a fair question to ask UNODC’s donors why they persist in funding programs that have had no demonstrable success, partner with the very officials protecting the narcotics trade who also happen to be war criminals, and produce polished reports that, placed in a 20-year timeline, should indicate failure on all fronts.

今年的鸦片调查是由美国和日本政府资助的。令人好奇的是，为什么这两个国家的政府不想弄清到底是谁参与了海洛因贸易。然而，这种起伏不定的鸦片生产和官方保护，以及许多官员的直接致富的动态，已经被允许恶化了几十年。问联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室的捐助者，为什么他们坚持资助那些没有明显成功的项目，为什么他们与保护毒品贸易的官员合作，而这些官员恰好也是战争罪犯，为什么他们制作的报告，在20年的时间里，应该表明各方面都失败了。

作者：大卫·斯科特·马西森          来源：伊洛瓦底江