Can China Help Myanmar Junta Recapture Northern Shan State?

中国能帮助缅甸军政府夺回掸邦吗？

作者：Ko Oo         来源：伊洛瓦底江

China threw Myanmar’s regime a diplomatic lifeline by welcoming junta boss Min Aung Hlaing to a regional summit this month.

中国欢迎缅甸军政府领导人敏昂莱（Min Aung Hlaing）参加本月举行的地区峰会，给缅甸政权抛出了一条外交生命线。

Rumors now swirl about potential military and economic assistance from Beijing.

现在关于北京可能提供军事和经济援助的传言甚嚣尘上。

China has been treading lightly, mindful of both international and Myanmar’s domestic hostility to the regime but it appears Min Aung Hlaing returned with some valuable Chinese promises.

考虑到国际社会和缅甸国内对政权的敌意，中国一直在谨慎行事，但敏昂莱似乎带着一些有价值的中国承诺回国。

China and northern Myanmar

中国和缅甸北部

Regime supporters and foreign observers have traditionally viewed the armed organizations along the Chinese border as Beijing’s puppets.

军政权的支持者和外国观察人士传统上将中国边境的武装组织视为北京的傀儡。

China pressured the groups based in northern Myanmar to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, participate in the Union Peace Conference and work with Myanmar’s military. The armed groups instead formed the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee to respond collectively to China’s pressure.

中国向缅甸北部的武装组织施压，要求他们签署2015年全国停火协议，参加联邦和平会议，并与缅甸军方合作。这些武装团体转而成立了联邦政治谈判与协商委员会，以集体回应中国的压力。

Operation 1027, launched in October last year, caused a rift between China and northern armed groups. The organizations initially tried to please Beijing by cracking down on online fraud syndicates operating along the border. But Beijing has now chosen to back the regime and it forced the armed groups to sign a truce in January this year to end the regime’s series of humiliating defeats.

去年10月发起的“1027行动”导致中国与北方武装组织之间出现裂痕。这些组织最初试图通过打击沿边境活动的网络诈骗集团来取悦北京。但北京方面现在选择支持军政权，并迫使各武装组织在今年1月签署停火协议，以结束该政权的一系列耻辱性失败。

The northern armed groups want to win China’s approval but Beijing does not have them on a string. They want to maintain good ties with China but they may not at the cost of sacrificing their ambitions of self-determination.

北方武装组织希望赢得中国的批准，但北京方面并没有对他们发号施令。他们希望与中国保持良好关系，但他们可能不会以牺牲民族自决的雄心为代价。

China told the Kachin Independence Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to halt their offensives, with threats to cut off supplies of food, electricity and fuel.

中国要求克钦独立军、缅甸民族民主同盟军（MNDAA）和德昂民族解放军（TNLA）停止进攻，并威胁要切断粮食、电力和燃料的供应。

As tensions have risen recently, some groups have chosen to send only lower-level representatives instead of senior members when summoned by China for talks in Yunnan.

最近紧张局势上升,一些组织已经选择只派低级而不是高级成员代表去中国云南举行会谈。

China told the United Wa State Army (UWSA) not to supply the groups fighting the regime. The Arakan Army – which operates in Rakhine State further from China’s reach – has conducted its offensives against the regime, free from Chinese interference since November last year.

中国要求佤邦联合军（UWSA）不要向与政府军作战的组织提供物资。自去年11月以来，在远离中国影响范围的若开邦开展行动的若开军（Arakan Army）一直在不受中国干涉的情况下对缅甸政权发动进攻。

Tensions between China and the MNDAA and TNLA have increased since June when the two groups abandoned China’s peace deal. The MNDAA subsequently seized the Northeastern Command and northern Shan State capital, Lashio. In response, China closed its Shan State border crossings.

自今年6月以来，中国与MNDAA和TNLA之间的紧张关系加剧，当时这两个组织放弃了中国的和平协议。缅甸民族民主同盟军随后占领了东北司令部和掸邦北部首府腊戍。作为回应，中国关闭了掸邦边境口岸。

Ta’ang National Liberation Army troops in Mantung Township, northern Shan State. / AFP

塔昂民族解放军部队在掸邦北部的满东镇。/法新社

Border closures

边境的关闭

The regime now only controls Muse after losing all other Shan and Kachin border crossings.

在失去了所有其他掸邦和克钦边境口岸后，缅甸政权现在只控制了木姐。

The closed border appears to be China’s attempt to throttle the armed groups and expose them to a regime counteroffensive.

关闭边境似乎是中国试图遏制武装组织，使他们暴露于军政权的反攻之下。

China has reinforced the borders with barbed wire. The crossings to Wa state and Kokang are manned by the Chinese security services to stop goods from reaching the MNDAA and TNLA.

中国用铁丝网加固了边界。通往佤邦和果敢的过境点由中国安全部门把守，以阻止货物进入MNDAA和TNLA控制区。

The regime has blockaded roads to northern Shan State, including the Taunggyi-Lawksawk road, but it struggles to impose a total blockade due to junta corruption at its checkpoints, which is one of the reasons drug trafficking is still rampant in Myanmar.

军政权封锁了通往掸邦北部的道路，包括东枝-劳克索克公路，但由于军政府在检查站的腐败，很难实施全面封锁，这是缅甸毒品贩运仍然猖獗的原因之一。

And the Chinese and regime blockades are less effective in Kachin State.

中国和缅甸政府的封锁在克钦邦也效果不佳。

Overall, China’s blockades appear not to have put the expected pressure on the northern armed groups.

总的来说，中国的封锁似乎没有给北方武装组织带来预期的压力。

Junta counteroffensive

军政府反攻

The regime appears to be planning to hit back in northern Shan State after imposing a blockade with China’s help. However, targeting Lashio is not enough.

缅甸军政权在中国的帮助下实施封锁后，似乎正计划在掸邦北部发动反击。然而，光瞄准腊戍是不够的。

To control trade routes to China, the regime needs to retake Nawnghkio, Lashio, Hseni, Kunlong, Chin Shwe Haw, Kutkai and Nampaka.

为了控制通往中国的贸易路线，军政权需要重新夺回Nawnghkio、Lashio、Hseni、Kunlong、chinshwe haww、kuutkai和Nampaka。

The regime has been collecting troops in Namlan and Mongyai, presumably to attack the MNDAA in Lashio. But to retake the rest of northern Shan State, the regime must advance along the highway from Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region to Nawnghkio, Hsipaw and Lashio in Shan State. Only control of the highway would allow the regime to use its artillery and armor effectively while ensuring easier supply lines.

缅甸政府一直在南兰和蒙崖集结军队，大概是为了攻击腊戍的民族民主同盟军。但先要夺回掸邦北部的其他地区，缅甸政权必须沿着从曼德勒地区的平乌伦（Pyin Oo Lwin）到掸邦的瑙吉欧（Nawnghkio）、西掌（Hsipaw）和腊戍（Lashio）的高速公路前进。只有控制了高速公路，政权才能有效地使用炮兵和装甲部队，同时确保更容易的补给线。

The regime will need more troops for offensives in Namhsan and Mantung as it lacks strong bases in the area to support frontline troops.

由于在南山和满东地区缺乏支援前线部队的坚实基地，因此需要更多的兵力进行进攻。

The People’s Defence Forces have left northern Shan but the MNDAA has expanded to six brigades and the TNLA to nine. Any junta offensive would likely require tens of thousands of troops while the ranks are already stretched thin and recruitment is a pressing issue.

人民国防军已经离开掸邦北部，但是民族民主同盟军（MNDAA）已经扩大到6个旅，德昂军（TNLA）已经扩大到9个旅。任何军政府的进攻都可能需要数以万计的军队，而军政府队伍已经捉襟见肘，征兵是一个紧迫的问题。

Recruitment crisis

招募危机

Chinese military technology cannot mask the regime’s depleted ranks. Analysts estimate that around 150 battalion headquarters only exist on paper, while the remaining units are increasingly threadbare.

中国的军事技术无法掩盖军政权的衰落。分析人士估计，大约有150个营部只存在于纸面上，而剩下的部队则越来越陈旧。

The implementation of February’s Conscription Law has been hampered by corruption and extortion. Recruiting officers are more focused on lining their pockets and the regime’s targets are not being met.

2月份征兵法的实施受到腐败和敲诈勒索的阻碍。招募官员更关注的是中饱私囊，而政权的目标没有实现。

Forcibly conscripted recruits are sent straight to the frontline after a few weeks of training where they are rapidly killed or captured.

被强行征召的新兵在经过几周的训练后被直接送往前线，在那里他们很快就会被杀死或俘虏。

No conscripts are willingly signing up and there are few experienced troops to hold units together. Conscrips are left to fend for themselves in the chaos of battle. The imbalance between raw recruits and a few experienced soldiers means there is no hope of combat effectiveness.

没有义务兵愿意参军，也没有经验丰富的部队来维持部队的团结。应征入伍的士兵只能在混乱的战斗中自谋生路。新兵和少数经验丰富的士兵之间的不平衡意味着没有希望提高战斗力。

Resistance volunteers often take around two years to learn combat skills while junta conscripts lack motivation and training. Few will develop into competent fighters.

抵抗组织的志愿者通常需要两年左右的时间来学习战斗技能，而军政府的义勇军则缺乏动力和训练。很少有人会成为有能力的战士。

With fighting in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin and Karen states and Sagaing Region, the junta urgently needs to bolster its forces on numerous fronts and will not be able to gather a force strong enough to seize back northern Shan State in the near future.

在若开邦、钦邦、克钦邦、克伦邦和实皆地区的战斗中，军政府迫切需要在多个战线上加强其部队，但在不久的将来，它将无法集结足够强大的部队，夺回掸邦北部。

Even if a new force can be found, success is not guaranteed: a poorly prepared operation is likely to suffer heavy losses.

即使能找到一支新的部队，也不能保证成功：准备不足的行动很可能遭受重大损失。

Conclusion

结论

It is unlikely that the regime will be able to launch an offensive to retake the lost border territories in the next six months. In the meantime, it might instead focus on airstrikes and the use of advanced drones, psychological warfare and propaganda.

军政权不太可能在未来6个月内发动进攻，夺回失去的边境领土。与此同时，它可能会把重点放在空袭和使用先进无人机、心理战和宣传上。

In MNDAA territory, battles could erupt if the military strikes towns surrounding Lashio ahead of a larger offensive. The MNDAA is unlikely to attack Tangyan and Mongyai where its allies, the UWSA and Shan State Progress Party, are deployed. But it may advance near those towns, which could increase tensions.

如果政府军在发动更大规模攻势之前袭击腊戍周围的城镇，在MNDAA领土上可能会爆发战斗。MNDAA不太可能攻击其盟友佤联军和掸邦进步党部署的唐岩和蒙崖。但它可能会在这些城镇附近推进，这可能会加剧紧张局势。

Fighting will continue in Nawnghkio in northern Shan State and Banhbwe towards Pyin Oo Lwin.

战斗将继续在掸邦北部的Nawnghkio和Banhbwe向Pyin Oo Lwin方向进行。

Armed groups are expected to undertake new operations in response to junta airstrikes.

武装组织预计将采取新的行动，以应对军政府的空袭。

The groups appear confident in their ability to survive Chinese and junta blockades and any regime counteroffensives. They will await Beijing’s next steps if its blockades fail.

这些组织似乎对自己在中国和军政府的封锁以及任何政权的反攻中幸存下来的能力充满信心。如果封锁失败，他们将等待北京的下一步行动。

The impacts of the proposed joint security “company” between the regime and China and the possibility of China’s detention of the leaders of armed groups will also need to be monitored. With its in-depth knowledge of Myanmar, China’s next steps will not be simple.

军政府与中国拟议的联合安全“公司”的影响，以及中国拘留武装组织领导人的可能性，也需要受到监控。基于对缅甸的深入了解，中国下一步的行动并不简单。

Ko Oo is an ethnic minority affairs analyst.

Ko Oo是一名少数民族事务分析人士。

作者：Ko Oo         来源：伊洛瓦底江