In recent years, Beijing has conducted security and political assessments and concluded that the Myanmar military regime, the State Administration Council (SAC), can no longer protect China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-related projects in Myanmar. Chinese sources in Beijing familiar with the situation said the SAC was considered too weak and unstable.

近年来，北京进行了安全和政治评估，并得出结论，缅甸军政府国家行政委员会（SAC）无法再保护中国在缅甸的一带一路倡议（BRI）相关项目。熟悉北京情况的中国消息人士表示，外界认为国委会过于软弱和不稳定。

This is the main reason behind China’s proposal to the junta to form a joint venture security company (JVSC), which has created headlines in Myanmar media as well as unease among top military leaders in Myanmar.

这就是中国向军政府提议组建合资保安公司（JVSC）的主要原因，这一提议成为缅甸媒体的头条新闻，也引起了缅甸军方高层领导人的不安。

After seeing the fall of northern Shan State capital Lashio in August and the escalation of armed conflict from northern Shan State to central Myanmar to Rakhine (areas through which China-owned oil and gas pipelines pass, as well as a proposed BRI-related railway line that would connect Kunming in China to Rakhine on the shore of the Bay of Bengal)—as well as a bomb attack on the Chinese Consulate in Mandalay—Beijing has been forced to come up with a proposal to defend its projects in Myanmar. It remains to be seen how Myanmar armed opposition groups including ethnic armed organizations and their allies will react to this.

在看到8月资本掸邦北部腊戍的秋天和武装冲突的升级从掸邦北部中央缅甸若开邦(通过是中国自有品牌的石油和天然气管道输送领域,以及提出BRI-related铁路,连接在中国昆明孟加拉湾的若开邦在岸边)以及一个炸弹袭击中国驻Mandalay-Beijing不得不想出一个方案来保护其项目在缅甸。包括少数民族武装组织在内的缅甸反对派武装团体及其盟友对此将作何反应，仍有待观察。

In the wake of the 2021 military coup and the nationwide armed revolt against the regime, China’s BRI projects in Myanmar have been stalled and face security challenges.

在2021年缅甸发生军事政变和全国范围内的反政府武装叛乱之后，中国在缅甸的“一带一路”项目陷入停滞，并面临安全挑战。

Since the launch of the BRI in 2013, Chinese private paramilitary companies have been active around the globe safeguarding China’s mega projects against perceived threats from criminals and violence. These Private Security Companies (PSCs) have been safeguarding Chinese ports and vital sea communication routes, collecting critical local intelligence, and deploying personnel for non-combatant evacuation operations.

自2013年“一带一路”倡议启动以来，中国私营准军事公司一直活跃在全球各地，保护中国的大型项目免受犯罪分子和暴力的威胁。这些私营保安公司（PSCs）一直在保护中国港口和重要的海上交通路线，收集重要的当地情报，并为非战斗人员撤离行动部署人员。

Despite being “private”, all Chinese PSCs are under the control of the Chinese government. They are largely made up of former servicemen from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and police force. They are equipped with modern firearms and sophisticated gadgets for intelligence gathering and communication. In short, PSCs are miniature Chinese armies in disguise dispatched to places where the PLA can’t be deployed.

尽管是“私人的”，但所有中国私人服务公司都在中国政府的控制之下。他们主要由中国人民解放军（PLA）和警察部队的退役军人组成。他们配备了现代武器和精密的情报收集和通讯设备。简而言之，PSCs是中国军队的缩影，被派往解放军无法部署的地方。

In fact, some Chinese scholars quietly admit that China’s show of force on the Myanmar border has had no effect at all.

事实上，一些中国学者私下承认，中国在缅甸边境的武力展示根本没有任何效果。

In late August, after the fall of Lashio to resistance ethnic armed groups and their allies, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to  Naypyitaw, Beijing held a live-fire military exercise near its border with Myanmar as a warning sign to the warring groups to maintain stability and security in the border area.

8月下旬，在腊戍被抵抗民族武装组织及其盟友攻陷后，中国外交部长王毅访问了内比都，北京在中缅边境附近举行了一次实弹军事演习，以警告交战各方保持边境地区的稳定和安全。

The PLA’s role is to project power and influence around the globe. But on the border with troubled Myanmar, it is not working at all as the fighting has spread and resistance groups have seized enough ground to threaten Myanmar’s second-largest city Mandalay, an observer of China-Myanmar affairs in Beijing admitted.

解放军的角色是在全球范围内投射力量和影响力。但一位在北京的中缅事务观察家承认，在与陷入困境的缅甸接壤的边境，随着战斗的蔓延，抵抗组织已经占领了足够的土地，威胁到缅甸第二大城市曼德勒，这根本不起作用。

China has held military drills near the border since fighting on the Myanmar side broke out in 2015. But it has made no difference; the situation has gotten worse with widespread fighting, the junta’s loss of more towns, and regime airstrikes near the border resulting in bombs and bullets landing on Chinese soil.

自2015年缅甸方面爆发冲突以来，中国一直在边境附近举行军事演习。但这并没有什么区别；随着广泛的战斗，军政府失去了更多的城镇，以及政府在边境附近的空袭导致炸弹和子弹落在中国领土上，情况变得更糟。

In July, armed resistance  forces seized two Chinese-invested joint ventures—a cement factory in Mandalay and a nickel mining company in Sagaing Region. The fall of Lashio came the next month. China decided “enough is enough” as the situation deteriorated to its lowest point.

7月，武装抵抗力量占领了两家中国投资的合资企业——曼德勒的一家水泥厂和实皆地区的一家镍矿公司。下个月腊戍陷落。随着形势恶化到最低点，中国决定“适可而止”。

In fact, since the live-fire drill held along the border in late August, senior officials in Beijing have been thinking about what new role the PLA can play in the Myanmar conflict to protect Chinese interests. That’s why they came up with the proposal of forming a joint venture security company for the safety of Chinese projects in Myanmar, with Beijing insisting that the junta comply with the proposal, sources said.

事实上，自8月下旬在边境举行实弹演习以来，北京的高级官员一直在考虑解放军在缅甸冲突中可以扮演什么新角色，以保护中国的利益。消息人士称，这就是为什么他们提出组建一家合资安全公司的建议，以确保中国在缅甸项目的安全，北京坚持要求军政府遵守这一建议。

In fact, Chinese security guards have been deployed for years at Chinese projects in Rakhine State’s Kyaukphyu. But they are not like the ones from the proposed joint venture security company, who will be equipped with modern firearms and sophisticated intelligence and communications devices.

事实上，在若开邦皎漂的中国项目中，中国保安人员已经部署了多年。但他们与拟议中的合资保安公司的警卫不同，后者将配备现代武器和先进的情报和通讯设备。

Yet to be seen is Beijing and Naypyitaw’s joint security plan for Myanmar’s (conflict prone) economic corridor, but it’s too early to make any predictions about that.

然而，北京和内比都对缅甸（容易发生冲突的）经济走廊的联合安全计划还有待观察，但现在做出任何预测还为时过早。